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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

DID THE BOARD HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE
FEE SCHEDULE EMBODIED IN ITS FOOD SERVICE/FOOD
ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING FEE STANDARDS?

II.

DID THE LICENSING FEE STANDARD AS IMPOSED BY THE BOARD
CONSTITUTE A TAX RATHER THAN A FEE?

III. MUST THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE
BOARD IN SUPPORT OF ITS ADOPTION OF ITS FOOD
SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING FEE STANDARDS BE
SUPPORTED BY SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC
HEARING?
REFERENCES TO REPORTS OF
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This case has been reported at 103 Utah Adv. Rep. 31.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This Petition arises out of the Order and Written Opinion of
the Utah Court of Appeals entered on March 10, 1989, reversing
the earlier Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court.

The

Opinion was written by the Hon. Norman H. Jackson and concurred
in by the other memoers of the panel hearing the matter, the Hon.
Richard C. Davidson, and the Hon. Russell W. Bench.

Jurisdiction

to review that decision by a Writ of Certiorari to this Court is
conferred by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-2 (3) (a) (1988) and Rules
42 through 48, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes,
ordinances and regulations that the case involves are set forth
in full in

plaintiffs' addendum to this Brief and include Utah

Code Ann. Sees. 26-24-14, 26-24-18 and 26-24-20 from the Local
1

Board of Health Act, together with Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 and
Sec. 10-8-80.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an action for declaratory judgment
brought by plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter referred to as
"plaintiffs") in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County to
determine the validity of certain "fees" imposed by the Salt Lake
City-County Board of Health (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") pursuant to a certain "Food Service/Food Establishment
Licensing Fee Standard" adopted by the Board.

The respective

parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for
Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation")
together with various Exhibits, which was submitted to the Court.
Each party submitted its respective Motion for Summary Judgment
and Memoranda in support of its Motion and in opposition to the
opposing Motion, seeking the Court's determination based upon
those facts and documents.

The Court issued its Ruling in the

form of a minute entry on June 24, 1987 (R. 166-167), and after
various objections were heard and resolved, the Court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 191-197) and Judgment
(R. 198-200) on August 18, 1987.

The Board appealed the District

Court's decision to this Court, which transferred the case to the
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (h)
(1986).

The Court of Appeals, after hearing the matter, entered

its Order and Opinion, reversing the Judgment of the District
Court.

In view of their central importance to the resolution of
2

this matter, the Stipulation and its attached Exhibits, as well
as the District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Judgment, and the Circuit Court's Order and Opinion, are
attached hereto as portions of the addendum to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF FACT^
This case was presented to the Court upon a Stipulation of
Facts and Issues for Determination (R. 46). The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law by the Board (R. 73-74) were included as
Exhibits to tne Stipulation,

While stipulating that those

Findings were entered, however, plaintiffs have emphasized
throughout this action that no evidence supporting any of the
dollar costs of the food inspection program or amounts to be
produced from the license fees were ever presented upon the
record, except through the Board's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law themselves.

The only items of testimony,

documents, papers, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, or
Orders of the Board regarding the proposal for the adoption of
the licensing fee standard were reflected in the Exhibits
attached to the Stipulation (R. 49, Para. 7). Those Exhibits
accurately reflected the times, places, and purposes, as well as
all actions taken, comments made, and other input given at the
public hearing.

The Board is a non-elected body appointed by the

Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act as a local board
of health.

At a June 1986 meeting, the Board discussed reviving

a plan to initiate an inspection fee to be paid by "food service/
food establishment" businesses. Staff members presented
3

information about inspection fee classifications and schedules in
several nearby states and estimated the health department was
spending $600,000.00 to inspect food establishments at least
twice yearly as required by the Utah State Food Service
Regulations.

The Board voted to hold a public hearing on the

proposal and a fee schedule or "fee standard" was drafted.
(Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 2). The licensing fee standard
established fee categories and fee amounts ranging from $15.00 to
$100.00 per year, based upon factors including the number of
service baysf the number of seats, the number of square feet in
the establishment, and whether it was a food service/food
establishment, a day care center, or a nursing home. (R. 55-59).
The inspections contemplated in the standard constituted no
change from previously conducted inspections, except that those
inspections were paid with Health Department funds (R. 49, Para.
8).
Following that determination, due and proper notice of a
public hearing on the licensing fee standard was given by the
Board (R. 53-54) and a public hearing was conducted on September
10, 1986, by a Board-appointed hearing officer from the Health
Department (R. 60-65).

A copy of the proposed Standard was made

available as part of the Notice to the public by the Board prior
to that public hearing (R. 55-59).
attended the public hearing.

Approximately thirty persons

No member of the Board or the local

health department was present, other than the hearing officer.
An that public hearing, all of the testimony and comments were
4

adverse to the adoption of the proposed licensing fee standard.
No testimony nor evidence of any sort was presented by the Board,
the department, nor its hearing officer in support of the
adoption of that standard (R. 60-65) or showing the basis for the
food establishment categories or fee amounts set forth in the
proposed inspection fee schedule (Court of Appeals Opinion, p.
2).

Persons attending the meeting were informed that a summary

of the hearing and written comments would be submitted to the
Board before its regular meeting on October 2, 1986, and that
interested parties could attend that meeting and make additional
comments before the Board if they desired. The Board then
prepared a draft of its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order (Court of Appeals Opinion, p. 2).
The meeting held on October 2, 1986, was a regular meeting
of the Board and not a "public hearing" Within the meaning of
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981).

The required notice for

such a "public hearing" was not published regarding that meeting.
At that time, the Board had before it a summary of the comments
from the earlier public hearing, written comments from the public
and Health Department staff prepared subsequent to the public
hearing responding to the criticism of the proposed standard made
at the public hearing (R. 75-79), and proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (R. 73-74), as well as the licensing fee
standard.

Further oral comments were incited from the private

parties and staff in attendance.

At the conclusion of the

hearing, the Board voted to implement the licensing fee standard,
5

whereupon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
previously drafted by the Board were executed (Draft of Record of
Board Meeting, R. 66-72).
The Board's determination that the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable was based upon the recommendations of that staff and the board's own deliberations, without
any public input in regard to those dollar amounts, categories or
definitions (R. 50, Para. 10).
Following the adoption of the licensing fee standard,
plaintiffs filed this action for a declaratory judgment to
determine the validity of the licensing fee standard.

The

District Court concluded that the Board did not have the
authority to impose charges as specified in the "Food
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards", that the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted by the Board
were unsupported by the evidence, and that the provisions of the
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards"
amounted to a tax which the Board had no power to impose and,
based upon those determinations, that the standard imposing the
charges was invalid and null and void ab initio and the Board
should be restrained from assessing any further charges pursuant
to those standards.

(R. 197-198)

The Court of Appeals reversed that decision on each basis,
holding, in its opinion:

(1) that the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law as adopted by the Board did not have to be
supported by evidence upon the record at the public hearing
6

because it was only a rulemaking hearing, not bound by the
limitations of an administrative adjudicative hearing, and that
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law could properly be
based upon any information secured by the board, formally or
informally; (2) that the Board had statutory power under Utah
Code Ann. 26-24-14 (14) et. seq. to impose fees to defray costs
of the local health department program; and (3) that the charges
imposed under the fee standard constituted "fees" and not "taxes"
because they were designed to actually defray some or all of the
costs of inspecting the food service establishments on which they
were imposed and there was some assurance that the money
collected would actually be used to defray those costs since the
funds were to be deposited into an account of the health fund and
funding to support the food inspection program was to be drawn
from that account.
ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE Of WRIT OF CERTIORARI
INTRODUCTION
The three issues presented to the District Court and
subsequently determined by the Court of Appeals are issues of
substantial significance to this state far beyond the specific
controversy involved in this action.

Th^ facts and issues in the

case were based upon written stipulation?, allowing this Court to
render its own interpretation of those facts and determinations
of applicable law, as did the Circuit Coiirt of Appeals.
The Third Judicial District Court has not been alone in its
7

interpretation regarding these issues.

The Davis County District

Court reached similar conclusions in its decision reviewed by
this Court in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board
of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Utah, 1985).

This Court's decision in

that case, unfortunately, did not need to reach those issues due
to the determination that there had been no Findings of Fact or
Conclusions of Law entered as required by the Statute, which
defect was adequate to resolve the case.

In its decision,

however, this Court did discuss some of the factors for
determination of whether a "fee" is really a "fee" or a tax in
the context of that case and further explained, albeit also that
should a similar fee regulation be attempted by the board in the
future, it would be "well advised to do so in careful compliance
with the procedures required by the Local Health Department
Act.".

Utah Restaurant Association, supra, at 1161.

The proper interpretation of such rights and statutes as
embodied in the three issues in this case are becoming more and
more important to the populace and the non-elected bodies with
governing powers over them.

The utilization of "user fees" and

"license fees" by local boards and non-elected bodies is becoming
a popular tool for securing increased revenue in various areas of
our society, as elected officials "tighten their belts" in order
to reduce taxes.

As elected officials limit funds available for

previous programs, the local non-elected bodies are attempting to
override the lack of funding for those programs by finding other
sources of funding and, in this case, the local boards of health
8

see the assessment of "fees" for their services as their
alternative.

When these "fees" are charged for services

requested by the party charged, such as preparation of
certificates, copying fees, or fees for use of swimming, golfing,
or similar voluntary facilities, such as have been normally
charged in the past, they are truly fees not affected by the
issues in this case.

however, as available tax funds have been

further restricted, these non-elected bodies are now seeking to
expand into programs established for the benefit of the general
public, and which are not requested by the person being charged,
such as the fees imposed in this case in regard to the board's
food inspection program.

The local boards of health, as well as

other non-elected bodies throughout this state, are closely
watching the progress of this case, as they did the previous Utah
Restaurant Association vs. Davis County Board of Health case for
guidance as to what approaches they may properly take, and the
manner in which they may proceed, if at $11, for the imposition
of such "fees" as a means of dealing with these reductions in
funding.

For these reasons, it is submitted that each of the

questions involved in this case, as hereinafter discussed,
constitute important questions regarding municipal and state law
which have not been, but should be, settled by this Court.
POINT I
DID THE BOARD HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT
THE FEE SCHEDULE EMBODIED IN ITS FOOD SERVICE/
FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING EJEE STANDARDS?
Absent statutory authority to impose such licensing fees,
9

the Board has no inherent power to charge any fees.

Utah

Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, Supra.
The only statutory authority for the imposition of the licensing
fees attempted to be imposed by the defendant is that generalized
language of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981), et seq.,
regarding powers and duties of local health departments, to,
"(14)

Establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use and

administer all federal, state or private donations or grants of
funds, . . . "

That lack of authority appears particularly

blatant when considered in light of the provisions regarding the
State Health Department's specific statutory authority to adopt a
"schedule of fees that may be assessed for services", which is
subject to the statutory restrictions that such fees must be
"reasonable and fair" and must further be "submitted to and
approved by the legislature as part of the department's annual
appropriations request . . .", Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 (1981).
It would not seera, under those circumstances, that the
legislature could oe said to have intended to grant authority for
the defendant to impose unrestricted licensing fees as sought to
be imposed in this matter.
While cases such as Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing
Company, 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477 (1917), Best Foods v.
Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001 (1930) and Salt Lake City
v. Bennion Gas & Coal Co., 15 P. 2d 648 (Utah 1932) have found
that the power to impose a "license fee or a license tax" is
within the police powers of the state to regulate or prohibit a
10

business and that inherent in those powets is the power to tax
for the cost of such regulation, those cases arose out of the
taxing powers of the governing body, which the Board does not
possess.

Even for counties, the right to conduct inspections has

been said to imply no right to tax merel^ for revenue.

See

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph go. v. Salt Lake County,
702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985) and Consolidated Coal Company v. Emery
County, 702 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1985).

Thus, the granting of the

power to the Board to adopt rules, regulations and standards and
to conduct health inspections does not imply such power to impose
fees to cover the costs of their services.

This is particularly

so where the legislature has statutorily provided other methods
of financing those inspections through appropriations from the
general fund, the levy of a tax or from local, state or federal
funds, as provided by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987).

See

Hill v. City of Eureka, 35 C.A. 2d 154, 94 P. 2d 1025 (1939).
If the lack of authority to impose such fees creates
hardships upon such non-elected bodies, they may properly take
their concerns to the elected governing bodies or seek redress
from the legislature.

As this Court explained in Consolidated

Coal, supra, in invalidating fees imposed by the county:
. . . (I)f it is necessary or desirable for counties to
raise revenues through licensing taxes, some limits
should exist to prevent some inequitable distributions
of the tax burden among a few businesses. The
Legislature is better equipped to devise such
limitations and to accommodate the competing interests
of counties and local businesses than the courts.
702 P. 2d at 126.
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly
11

determined that board did not have statutory authority to enact
the tee schedule embodied in its food service/food establishment
licensing fee standards and therefor determined that they were
invalid and void ab initio.

It is further respectfully submitted

that the decision by the Court of Appeals reversing the decision
of the District Court involves an important question of municipal
and state law which has not been, but should bef settled by this
Court for the reasons set forth at the beginning of this
Argument.
POINT II
DOES THE LICENSING FEE STANDARD AS IMPOSED BY
THE BOARD CONSTITUTE A TAX RATHER THAN A FEE?
The licensing fee standard is a revenue raising measure with no
reasonable relationship to the cost of any increased service.
The parties stipulated that the services rendered to the food
establishments would not be increased as a result of the fee
standard.

It provides no "demonstrable benefit" to the food

establishments.

Rather, it merely continues inspections which

were previously conducted without the imposition of such fees.
A series of cases by this Court have considered the issue of
"impact fees" as "taxes" in connection with subdivision
developments.

Weber Basin Home Builders v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d

215, 487 P. 2d 866 (1971) held that the increased fees were
impermissible where the increase in fees:
". . .admittedly had no relationship to increased costs of
the service rendered; and more importantly, where the
declared purpose was to raise general revenue for the city,
. . . the increase placed a disproportionate and unfair
burden on new households . . . " 487 P. 2d at 867.
12

Banberry Development Corp, v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d
899 (Utah 1981), directed that, in order to justify the
imposition of such a fee, the benefit provided did not need to
accrue solely to the person paying the fee but "the benefits
derived from the exaction must be of some demonstrable benefit"
to the party upon which the fee was imposed and it must bear some
reasonable relationship to the need created by the applicant.

To

a similar effect was Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271
(Utah 1979), on reh. 614 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 (Utah 1982),
distinguished valid "fees from invalid "taxes" based on the
principle that, "A reasonable charge for a specific service is
permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a revenue
measure is not."

Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmington

City, 599 P. 2d 1242 (Utah 1979) found it to constitute an abuse
of the taxing power when such "fees" were imposed upon a business
for the benefit of the community as a whole, even when coupled
with "vague promises of improved serviced" which the business, to
a large extent, did not need.

Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah

560, 63 P. 2d 259, 263 (1953), found that where fees are charged
for services in probate proceedings, "th$ amount of fees that may
be exacted must bear some reasonable relation to the extent and
nature of the services rendered.
contemplation of law, taxes."

Otherwise such fees are, in
Similarly, Cache County v.

Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900), explained:
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"Neither the constitution nor the statute authorizes
• . . ordinances . . . to tax citizens arbitrarily and
unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to
regulation."
61 P. at 304.
In National Cable Television Association v. United States,
94 S. Ct. 1146, 415 U. S. 336, 39 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1974), the Court
found tnat a fee schedule established by a non-elected body (rhe
FCC) for CATV systems which was based on the annual direct and
indirect costs for CATV regulation was not appropriate where it
failed to take into consideration the costs which inured to the
benefit of the public.

The Court explained that, unlike a tax:

A fee . . . is incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a
request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice
law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast
station. The public agency performing those services
normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably,
bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other
members of society. * * * If assessments are made by the
Commission which are sufficient to recoup costs to the
Commission for its oversight, the CATV's and other
broadcasters would be paying not only for benefits they
received but for the protective services rendered the
public by the Commission. 415 U. S. 337-338.
In the present case, the local board's main function is
similarly to safeguard the public interest and health.

By

imposing a portion of the costs of its operations upon the food
establishments, those establishments are forced to pay for the
protective services rendered to the public by the Board.
However, unlike the CATV operators, the food establishments have
not even sought licenses from the Board to operate but have
already obtained business licenses allowing their operation.
Under these circumstances, the District Court properly
determined that the charges embodied in the fee standard amounted
14

the standards were invalid and void ab initio for those reasons.
It is further respectfully submitted that the decision by the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the District Court
involves an important question of municipal and state law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court for the
reasons set forth at the beginning of this Argument.
POINT III
MUST THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BY THE
BOARD IN SUPPORT OF ITS ADOPTION OF ITS FOOD SERVICE/
FOOD ESTABLISHMENT LICENSING FEE STANDARDS BE SUPPORTED
BY SOME EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC HEARING?
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted by the
Board are statutorily mandated by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20
(1981), without which the fee schedule could not be properly
promulgated.

Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board

of Health, supra.

Where such Findings and Conclusions are

mandated, such as in courts or adjudicatory proceedings, they
must have some support in the record, or the mandate serves no
purpose.

They must show that the Judgment or Order "follows

logically from, and is supportable by, the evidence."
Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986).

Smith v.

There is no support for

the Findings of the Board from the record of the public hearing
on September 10, 1986. The meeting of the Board on October 2,
1986, was not such a mandated "public hearing".

The Board, in

adopting the licensing fee standard, relied solely on staff input
and on its own personal judgment, neither of which was produced
at the public hearing.

There is no evidence or information in

the record supporting: the various categories of the licensing
15

the record supporting: the various categories of the licensing
fee standard; the various criteria on which the fee is based; the
actual costs of inspections as opposed to other food service
programs; the proportionate benefit from the inspection program
to the public in general; the increased benefits to be received
by the restaurants and food establishments; the amounts which
would be produced by such inspections; the rationale behind
having one-third of the cost of the entire program borne by
inspection fees; or the means of dedicating funds obtained for
the purpose of the inspection program to insure that the funding
obtained from the program could not be used for other Board
operations or fooa service programs•
These issues, together with other vital issues, should have
been fully and completely considered by the Board at the public
hearing.

The public should have been given an opportunity to

provide input and ask questions regarding the imposition of the
fee standards.

The Board satisfied neither the letter nor the

spirit of the law nor of this Court's decision in Utah Restaurant
Association v. Davis County Board of Health, in holding a public
hearing but basing its Findings and Conclusions on evidence
submitted by Board members and staff prior to the hearing and
that was not submitted to public review.
Findings of Fact, supported upon the record of a public
hearing, serve a two-fold purpose.

They establish the basis for

the Order and assure the public an effective opportunity for
determining the accuracy of input, rebutting inaccurate input,
16

verifying presentations, and explaining concerns regarding the
bases alleged as support for such order.

They also provide the

basis for meeting previous Utah Supreme Court pronouncements that
an administrative body must disclose the bases of its
calculations to persons challenging the reasonableness of fees,
so that compliance with the various statutory and constitutional
standards can be ascertained by a reviewing court.

See Banberry

and Lafferty, supra, and Homebuilder's Association of Greater
Salt Lake v. Provo City, 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451 (1972).
Allowing such Findings and Conclusions to stand without any
basis in the record is tantamount to determining that the
legislative mandate was meaningless and & meaningless mandate
would not have been enforced by this Court as it did in Utah
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, supra.
Having determined that those Findings an<fi Conclusions were
mandated, that mandate must be interpreted in such a manner "as
to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful. . ." Millett
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1980).
That is not to say that all rule-making actions by
administrative bodies must be based upon evidence produced upon
the record of the hearing where such rules are adopted.

The

mandate, as this Court noted in Utah Restaurant Association v.
Davis County, supra, is somewhat unusual in regard to nonad judicatory proceedings.

Nevertheless, the legislature did see

fit to mandate that this procedure normally utilized in such
adjudicatory proceedings, be utilized in regard to particular
17

rulemaking hearings of the local board of health.

Thus, Basic

hornbook law prohibits it from basing its decision upon its own
knowledge, secret staff input, or other evidence outside of the
hearing.

2 Am. Jr. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 444, 73A

C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, Sec. 126, and 18
A.L.R. 2d, Administrative Law - Evidence, Sec. 3.

Utah case law,

in matters where such Findings and Conclusions have been
required, have similarly mandated that they must be based upon
evidence brought into the case and made part of the record.

See

Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 17 P. 2d
287 (Utah 1932) (Denial of application to discontinue operation
of agency railroad station); Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81
Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618 (1933) (Industrial Commission award);
Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, 24 Utah 2d 339, 471 P. 2d 161
(1970) (Order of Financial Institutions Commissioner for a unit
bank in Clearfield, Utah); State of Utah in the Interest of
Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P. 2d 395 (1970) (Social
file not introduced at hearing).
In City of Fairbanks v. Alaska P.U.C., 611 P. 2d 493 (Alaska
1980), the Alaska Supreme Court concisely expressed the purposes
of the requirement that the facts found by an agency be based
only upon evidence in the record:
First, it helps to ensure that the agency does not make
decisions that have no adequate basis in fact; second,
it gives opposing parties the opportunity to challenge
the agency's reasoning process and the correctness of
the decision; and third, it affords reviewing courts
the opportunity to evaluate the decision.
As earlier reflected, in the present case, the Board's fee
18

standards were prepared from the personal knowledge and input of
its members and staff.

Although persons attending the hearing

were allowed to voice their opinions concerning the imposition of
the fee standards, they were not provided with any substantive
evidence concerning those standards, their bases, nor the bases
of the board's actions.

Similarly, they were denied an effective

opportunity for rebuttal, verification or explanation regarding
the bases of those actions, with no opportunity to address the
competency, sufficiency, or accuracy of the input considered by
the Board.

The hearing was apparently intended to satisfy what

the Board considered to be a mere technicality of the Code, not
to secure any valid input nor to allow tjie public to ensure that
evidence was competent, sufficient and accurate.

Perhaps most

important, however, since the Board's Findings and Conclusions
are not supported by evidence within the record, a reviewing
court was left with no means to adequately evaluate these
determinations of the Board.
The reasonableness of the fees being imposed by the Board
were challenged by the public at the hearing and in written
comments received by the Board prior to the hearing.

However,

the Board did not disclose any basis of its calculations nor was
anyone from the Board even present at the hearing.

Notwith-

standing the lack of information at the hearing, one of the
Board's Findings of Fact was that "(W)hile objection was raised
by several individuals as to the charging of the fees, no
information was brought forward which demonstrated that the
19

proposed fees . . . was not tied directly to the cost of the
inspection program and to be used to support this cost."

This

Finding reflects that the Board improperly viewed its burden of
determining the reasonableness of the fee schedule prior to its
adoption.

The Board failed to meet its specific burden of

showing the bases upon which the reasonableness of the proposed
fees could be determined, as required by Banberry, Laffertyf and
Homebuilders, Supra.
Under such circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that
the District Court properly determined that the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law by the board in support of its adoption of
its food service/food establishment licensing fee standards must
be supported by some evidence presented at the public hearing
and, absent such support, the standard was invalid and void, ab
initio.

Again, it is respectfully submitted that the decision by

the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the District Court
involves an important question of municipal and state law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this Court for the
reasons set forth at the beginning of this Argument.
ATKIN & ANDERSON
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ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENTS* BRIEF

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
10-8-80.

License fees and taxes.

They may raise revenue by levying and collecting a license
fee or tax on any business within the limits of the city, and
regulate the same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or
town shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or sells
goods in such city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration
of powers of cities contained in this chapter, shall be deemed to
limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in
respect to the class upon which they are imposed.
26-1-6.

Fee schedule adopted by department.

The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be
assessed for services rendered by the department, provided that
such fees shall be reasonable and fair and shall be submitted to
and approved by the legislature as part of the department's
annual appropriations request. Such fees shall be paid into the
state treasury in accordance with Section 63-38-9.
26-24-14.
•

*

Powers and duties of departments.
*

(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use
and administer all federal, state, or private donations or grants
of funds, property, services, or materials for public health
purposes, and to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law,
as may be required as a condition to receiving such donation or
grant;
* * *

26-24-18.

Health department fund - Sources - Uses.

The treasurer of a health department shall, on organization
of the department, create a health department fund to which shall
be credited any moneys appropriated or otherwise made available
by participating counties, cities, or other local political
subdivisions and any moneys received from the state, federal
government, or from surpluses, grants, fees or donations for
local health purposes. Any moneys credited to this fund shall oe
expended only for maintenance and operation of the local health
department and claims or demands against the fund shall be
allowed on certification by the health officer or other employee
of the local health department designated by the board.

26-24-20. Regulations adopted by local board - Procedure Administrative and Judicial Review of Actions.
(1) The board may adopt rules, regulations, and standards,
not in conflict with rules of the department . . .
(2) The board shall provide public hearings prior to the
adoption of any rule, regulation or standard. Notice of any such
public hearing shall be published at least twice in a newspaper
of general circulation in the area within the jurisdiction of the
local health department.
(3) The hearings may be conducted by the board at a regular
or special meeting, or the board may appoint hearing officers,
who shall have power and authority to conduct hearings in the
name of the board at a designated time and place. A record or
summary of the proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and
filed with the board, together with findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and the order of the board or hearing officer. In any
hearing, a member of the board or the hearing officer shall have
the power to administer oaths, examine witnesses, and issue
notice of the hearings or subpoenas in the name of the board
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of
evidence relevant to any matter in the hearing.
* * *
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH RESTAURANT A S S O C I A T I O N , a
Utah n o n - p r o r i t
corporation,
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS A S S O C I A T I O N ,
a Utah n o n - p r o r i t
corporation,
UTAn HOTEL-MOTEL A S S O C I A T I O N , a
Utan n o n - p r o t i t
corporation,
L A M B ' S RESTAURANT, FLYING " J "
UTAH FOOD & C A T E R I N G , I N C . , DELS
FAMILY RESTAURANTS, KENTUCKY
F R I E D CHICKEN-HARMON'S MANAGEMENT C O R P . , GASTRONOMY, I N C . ,
TACO MAKER, I N C . , MARKET STREET
G R I L L , MARKET STREET BROILER
NEW YORKER RESTAURANT, HILTON
HOTELS-PEARSON E N T E R P R I S E S ,
S I Z Z L I N G PLATTER, I N C . , S T A N ' S
MARKET, N . P . S . , CRYSTAL
PALACE MARKET, WHEEL-IN MARKET,
THE TABLE S U P P L Y , VOYLES
MARKET, THE STORE, A L B E R T S O N ' S
I N C . , FAMILY MARKET, SAFEWAY
S T O R E S , I N C . , THE TANNING
E X P E R I E N C E , O . P . SKAGGS # i ,
SAB E N T E R P R I S E S , 8TH AVE.
MEAT AND GROCERY, M A C E Y ' S ,
I N C . , B E L u ' S 4 8 T H S T . MARKET,
PETERSON FOODTOWN, F O O D - 4 - L E S S
D A N ' S FOODS, M O N T I E ' S BESTWAY,
AND H A L E ' S MARKET,
Plain t i n s ,
- vsSALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY
HEALTH,

BOARD OF

Defendant.

STIPULATION OF FACTS AND
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
CJ.VI1 No.
Cdb-9J2^t
Honorable Judge Moiiat

COME NOW the parties to the aoove-ent1tled natter, by
and through their counsel or record and do hereby stipulate and
agree as rollows:
1.

Plaintiff Associations, the Utah Restaurant

Association, Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah
Hotel-Motel Association, are non~pront corporations, duly
oryanized and existing under the laws or the State or Utah,
with their principal places or business in Salt Lake County,
and whose memberships are composed or persons, corporations,
partnerships, and other entities engaged in, associated with,
or having a direct interest in, the restaurant and food service
industry in this state, whose memoerships include numerous
persons whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County,
and which are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment
Licensing Fee" standard involved in this action.

Each of those

associations is a person within the meaning of Utah's
Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code
Anno, (1953), as amended and Utah's Administrative Rulemaking
Act, Section o3-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as
amended, anu each piamtii: is entitled to the reiiei sought
tiiereunoer.
z.

The remaining plamtirrs are also persons suuject

to, and whose legal relations are arrected by, tne "Food
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" stanuaard and Fee
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Schedule involved herein ana are persons w i t m n the meaning OL
the Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 7d-33-l, et seq. U tan
Coue Anno. (19^3), as amenued, as well as within the Uian
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 63-4ba-l, et seq., Utan
Code Anno. (19b3), as amended.
3.

The Salt Lake City-County Board or Healtn

(here±naiter referred to as the "Board") is a non-electea boay,
appointed by the Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act
ab a local board or health pursuant to the provisions oi
Sections 2b-24-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno.

(19D3),

as amended,

whose statutory powers and duties are speciried therein.
4.

The Board, as a separate body, is amenaole to suit

and lfc subject to the jurisdiction and process or tins Court,
pursuant to Sections b3-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (19sJ), as
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno.

(19D3J,

as amended.
b. This is an action brought by the piaintuts pursuant
to the provisions or the atoresaid Section^ and Rule bl,

Utah

Rules ot Civil Procedure, ror a declaratory judgment to
determine the validity and constitutionality ot the "Food
Service/Foou Establishment Licensing Fee" standard adopted oy
the Boaro and which is the suoject or this action.
6.

Exhibits "A" through "H", which are attached hereto

and, uy reference, made a part hereoi, accurately rellect ail
meetings or the Board relative to the standara and ree schedule

specirieu therein, which is the suoject master 01 tins action
and accurately set iorth the times, places^ and purposes or
those meetings, as well as all actions taken, comments made,
and other input on that topic at those meetings, and all
notices thereoi, which were considered in the ultimate
lormulation or the Board's Findings 01 Fact and Conclusions or
Law relative to the adoption 01 the standard and tee schedule,
as included within those Exhibits.
7.

Except as referred to in Paragraphs 6 there are no

other items ot testimony, documents, papers, Findings or Fact,
Conclusions or Law, or Orders or the Board regarding the
proposal tor the adoption or the standard ana ree schedule
which is the subject or this action.
d.

The inspections contemplated in the aroresaid

standard and tee schedule would constitute no change trom such
inspections previously conducted, except that those previous
inspections were paid with Heath Department runds.
9.

Fees collected to date pursuant to the "Food

Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and ree
soheuv-le have not Deen expended for any purpose out have been
deposited into a health department rund and are reilecteJ, ror
bookkeeping purposes, as a credit to a separate discretionary
Heaith Department account, which does not rerlect deposits iron
any other source.

It is intended that this account would oe

used to pay ror a portion ot the lood inspection program or,
-4-

n

the Court should so direct, to provide a reiuna to tne persons
paying tne same.
10.

The dollar amounts, categories and dennitions

applied to those categories as rerlected in the "Food
Service/Foou Establishment Licensing Fee" standard ana ree
schedule were prepared by, ana adopted cased upon the
recommendations or, the Health Department staii.

The stari

indicated, and the Board determined based upon the
recommendations of stair and their own deliberations, that
those dollar amounts, categories and detimtions were
reasonauie.

There was no public input regarding those dollar

amounts, categories, ana detinitions.
11.

This action is one

which requires the immediate

attention 01 this Court and an immediate hearing in the
interests or all parties concerned, in that lrreparaole harm
may result to either or ooth parties absent such immediate
determination or the Court, unless the Court's time is rurther
encuinuered with a hearing on a temporary restraining order or
injunction.

It appearing that there are no remaining issuer or

materxal tact to preclude a determination on the issues 01 law
oy tiiis Court, it is respectfully submitted that there is no
need to delay tne ultimate hearing herein, witn the resulting
necessity or a hearing on a temporary restraining order or
mjunct ion.
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BASED UPON the roregomg stipulations or tact, the
parties seek the Decision ot tins Court as to the following
issues of law:
1.

Does the Detendant have the authority to impose

charges such as those speciried in the standard imposing the
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" ana fee
schedule tor rood service establishments, pursuant to the
provisions or Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
or otherwise and, it not, is the standard imposing those
charges valid?
2.

Did tne Defendant comply with the requirements or

Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (19b3), in imposing
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing FeeM and fee
schedule ror rood service establishments and, ir not, is the
standard imposing those charges valid?
3.

Are the Findings or Fact and Conclusions or Law by

the Board (Exhibit " E " ) , supported by any evidence presented at
the hearings on this matter and, ir not, is the standard
imposiny those charges valid?
4.

Do the provisions or the "Food Service/Food

Establ isninent Licensing Fee" ana ree schedule amount to a
"tax", rather than a "fee"?

Ir so, the parties stipulate that

the standard is not valid.
Counsel do rurther stipulate and agree that they shall
rile their mutual Motions ror Summary Judgment and supporting
-b-

Memoranda, b a s e d upon t h e t o r e g o i n g

Stipulation

weeKs trom t h e d a t e o r e x e c u t i o n o r

t h i s S t i p u l a t i o n ana,

they s h a l l

t i l e any d e s i r e d

wee< a r t e r

s e r v i c e or

ana,

May 29,

two

r e s p o n s i v e Memoranda w i t h i n

that

one

t h e i r o p p o n e n t ' s Motion and Meraorandun,

so a s t o a l l o w c o n s i d e r a t i o n
soon a r t e r

within

by t h e C o u r t o t

1987, as w i l l

by way o r t h i s S t i p u l a t i o n ,

t h i s matter

neet with the C o u r t ' s
move t h e C o u r t

accellerated hearing aate.

ana

Scneu^le

l o r such an
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:K±n, E s q .
fy t o r P l a m t i t t b
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

fct* ~f m
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Thomas L. Chrlbtensen, Esq.
Attorneys tor Derendaat
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S A L T L A K E &$} C I T Y - C O U N T Y
H E A L T H J5= ( ^ D E P A R T M E N T

610 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: 530-7500 •
HARRY L. GIBBONS, M.D n M.P.H.
Director

NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING

BOARt, OF HEALTH
L. .tod Mormon. M.D.
Chairman
C O ClarV. D OS.
Vice Chairman
Craig E. Petenon
Crty Government
M. Tom Shimuu
County Commissioner
Rob** A Angle
John M Sevan, D O S .
•tome* Dams. Mayor
South San Lake
Janet R. Green
Wilfred Higash.. Ph 0.
Ctndy Guti-Jensen
LaRetl 0 Muir. Mayor
Murray City
Rulon Simmons. M D
Lawrence P. Smith, Mayor
Sandy Cfty
•tori Taylor
Sandra K Ercanbrack
Secretary

Before the Salt Lake City-County Board of
Health

In the matter of proposed annual fees to be charged for
inspections of FOOD ESTABLISHMENTSr POOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS,
AND ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD
PRODUCTS.
TO WHOM IT MAY 0CNCERN:
Please take notice that the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health will
conduct a public hearing for the purpose of receiving comments and
reccrmendations concerning proposed annual fees to be charged for
inspection of F0CD ESTABLISHMENTS, FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, A!©
ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD PRODUCTS.
Authority to charge the said fees is embodied in Section 4.2 of the
respective said regulations of the Salt Lake City-County Health
Department, pursuant to Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as arrended.

Copies of the full text of the proposed fee charges are now available
for public inspection at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department
Building,

610 South 200 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.
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A hearing for the purpose of obtaining caiments concerning the
proposed fee charges has been scheduled for Septenber 10, 1986,
10:00 a.m., at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department
auditorium,

610 South 200 East,

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111.

Representatives of food establishments, food service establishments,
establishments for the processing of meat and neat food products,
hospitals, nursing hemes, correctional institutions

day care canters,

and the general jublic within or outside Salt Lake County are
invited to appear and present their views relevant to the proposals.
Oral statements will be accepted at the hearing, but, for accuracy
of the record, written statements are encouraged and will be
accepted at the time of the hearing or prior thereto.
Statements or questions should be addressed to:

Eugene Devenport,

Proposed Fee Charges, Salt Lake City-County Health Department,
610 South 200 East,
number (801)

Salt Lake City, Utah

84111. Telephone

530-7525. Statements will be accepted if received

on or before September 10, 1986,

5:00 p.m.

POOD SERVICE/FQDD ESTABLISHMENT
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS
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4.2.
of

follows :

Definitions:

Food Service Establishments

-

Restaurants, restaurants/clubs,
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias,
snack bars/fountains, nursing
homes, day care centers, bars,
lounges, ice cream stores,
or

intended for individual portion
service, whether the consumption is
on or off the premises or there is
a charge for the food. This does not
include private hemes where food is
prepared or served for individual
family consumption.
Food Establishments -

Temporary Food Service
Establishments -

Grocery stores, bakeries, candy
factories, bottling plants, convenience
stores, canning factories, meat
processing plants, cold storage warehouses, food storage warehouses, or
similar establishments where food products are manufactured, canned, packed,
processed, stored, transported, prepared,
sold, or offered for sale.

Food Service establishments that operate at a fixed location for not more than
14 consecutive days in conjunction with
a single event or celebration.

Service Bays -

Include, but are not limited to, cash
register stands, drive-up windows, walkup windows, and/or different points from
which food is dispensed or served to the
public. Waited tables are not considered
service bays.

Seats -

Seating that is available for the
public within a food service establishment.
The number of seats shall be determined
by the listing an the business license
application or by physical count by the
regulatory authority.
Banquet seating, not used for everyday
seating, shall not be included in the
total number of seats. The number of
beds, in lieu of xhe number of seats,
may be used to classify hospitals and
correctional institutions.
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Square Footage

Square
footage
will
be determined
on the basifc of the outside wall
measurements of the food establishment.

-
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Annual Fees.
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shall

criteria

of
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one

annual

be
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All

classified
(6)

food

service/food establishments

according

categories

for

to

the

the

purpose

following
of

fees:

Category

I

$40.00

Day Care centers, nursing hemes and food
service/food establishments providing
either one sejrvice bay or zero to ten
seats.

Category

II

$60.00

Food service/food establishments providing either tv*> service bays or
eleven to fifty seats.

Category

III

$80.00

Food service/food establishments providing either three service bays
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats.

Category

IV

$100.00

Category

V

Category

VI

(a)

$40.00

Food establishments
with
2,000
square
feet.

under

(b)

$60.00

2,000

to

3,000

square

feet.

(c)

$80.00

3,000

to

5,000

square

feet.

(d) $100.00

5,000

square

$10.00 flat
+ $5.00 per
day (not to
exceed $35 total)

Temporary food
service
establishments
operating
fourteen days or
less.

Section H I .

in

Food service/food establishments providing either
four
or
more
service
bays
or seventy-six
or
more
seats.
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PUBLIC HEARING
September 10, 1986
REi
FOR:

PROPOSED FOOD INSPECTION FEE STANDARDS
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT

PRESENT
Senator Haven Barlow
Eldon Riding
Keith Murray
Spud Warren
Julie Peck
Robert Cohne
Max Fillmore
James V. Olsen
Ron Morgan
Stan Briggs
Bil Larson
Dee Jordan
Earl Hardwick
Burr Miller
LaMar Evans
Fred Ball
Robert Walsh
Emalynn Heath
Stephen Hurt
Carolyn Masters
Ken Masters
Paula Coyle
Donald Beck
Michael Berg
Hersh Ipaktchian
Ray Ascani
Joan Perry
Senator Jack Bangerter
M. Lindberg
Lee Hutchinson
Tom Christensen
Glenn Austin
Bryan Gray
C.J. Santoro
Keith Comlee
Howard Stephenson
Eugene Devenport
Bill Davis
Doyle Parton
Terry Sadler

REPRESENTING
Self 6 Many Legislators
Flying J Inc.
Jordan Queen Restaurant
Flying J Inc.
Utah Hotel Motel Association
Self
Utah Restaurant Association
Utah Retail Grocer's Association
Utah Restaurant Association
Utah Food & Catering
Stewart Sandwiches
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge
Chairman - Salt Lake City Council
Holiday Inn - Downtown
Utah Restaurant Association
Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce
Business Enterprise Program
Business Enterprise Program
Salt Lake Tribune
Jimax Lounge
Jimax Lounge
Dan Glo's Restaurant 6 Lounge
Utah Licensed Club Association
Holiday Inn - Downtown
Utah Restaurant Association
Cedar Lounge
West Valley City Business License
Utah State Senate
Self
Self
Salt Lake County Attorney
Afterword^ Restaurant
Utah Restaurant Association
Marriott Corporation
Warren's Restaurant - Roy, Utah
Utah Taxpayer's Association
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department
Hearing Officer

The deadline to receive written comments was set at Wednesday,
September 10, 1986, at 5t00 p.m. in the Administration Office
of the Salt Lake City-County Health Department.
,./

Julie Peck, Administrative Assistant for the Utah Hotel
Motel Association, read and submitted written comments. The
Association is opposed to any collection of fees for health
inspections. They find it ironic that the County would require
period inspections of their restaurants- and then charge for the
inspection. Ms. Peck stated the restaurants contribute to the
cost through the fees for food handler permits, business, licenses
and taxes collected.
Robert Cohne, representing himself as a private taxpayer,
strongly opposes the proposed food inspection. Mr. Cohne, a
former restaurant owner, urged the Health Department to seek
additional funds to cover the inspections from the County Commission from the current tax base.
Max Fillmore, President of the Utah Restaurant Association
(URA), read and submitted written comments. The URA strongly
objects to the fee and recommended that it not be approved. Mr.
Fillmore stated the Health Department exists for the benefit and
protection of the general public and that operating expenses
should be paid from the general tax fund. The department should
also consider creative methods of filling the inspection need
other than increasing staff and assessing special fees. Mr.
Fillmore suggested that the Health Department should deal
directly in problem areas and conduct lesp frequent inspections
of restaurants with higher scores.
Burr Miller, representing Holiday Inn - Downtown, stated
the proposed fees would create a great butden to an already redlined restaurant.
Don Beck, Utah Licensed Club Association, represents the
111 licensed private clubs in Utah, 54 of which are in Salt Lake
County. The Association strongly supports the earlier comments
made by the Utah Restaurant Association and the Salt Lake Area
Chamber of Commerce in opposing the proposed food inspection
fees. Mr. Beck stated the fees are an unfair tax against the
food industry and urged the Health Department not to adopt the
standards .
Earl Hardvick, representing the Salt Lake City Council
District *4, opposes the proposed standards and classified it
as a user fee. Adoption of the fees would result in nothing but
a negative economical impact on facilities required to have the
inspections. The services are to ensure the safety of the
general public and should be a general funded item.
Hersh Ipaktchian, URA Legislative Chairman, read and submitted written comments. Mr. Ipaktchian strongly opposes the
proposed fee and feels it is another example of government
singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house budget
problem. This issue has statewide impact since other Utah

r,oo'* ;

STATEMENT OF POSITION
SALT LAKE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
SEPTEMBER 9f 1986
The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Board of Governors, in their
bimonthly meeting held on September 9, 1986, came out unanimously
against the proposed special fee to finance health inspections.
It was the consensus of the Board that the present inspections
are essential to the public health and are a direct benefit to
the tax payers and residents of this .county. It is a needed service
to have the inspections, but is discriminatory to expect that the
inspected facilities should be mandated to pay a fee for such
service.
It is our understanding that the duration ,.frequency and content
of the inspections are the direct respons ibility, and at the convenience of the City/County Health Departmen t. This arbitrary scheduling and frequency presents a burden on the food service industry
which they should not have to bear. The industry currently pays
a great deal of property tax to the taxin g entities and also pays
fees for food handlers1 permits. These t axes, coupled with additional charges such as business licenses and other such charges,
consitute a true threat to profitability and success.
Several members of the Board of Governors expressed concern regarding the potential of escalating fees, such as this, aimed at
specific businesses already sorely pressed to make a profit. These
businesses are already paying health taxes and user fees to government entities.
The Board of Governors of the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce
regards this proposed fee as a tax increase, and we feel that tax
increases should be dispersed so that they are not "sock it to
business" taxes. Since all citizens benefit from the inspections,
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce believes that all citizens
should assist in bearing the cost of such inspections.
Sincerely submitted,

Fred S. Ball
President and General Manager
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce

The health inspectors have no more right to inspection fees
firemen do for their inspections.

than the

Then what about the meat

inspectors, weights and measures, etc* are they all going to follow
suit?

The real issue here is who actually benefits from these

inspections?

The general public is who the health department and

the other inspectors are protecting.

It isn't a matter of whether the

grocer wants or invites the inspectors into our businesses.
control over if or when we will be inspected.

We have no

Therefore, if the

inspection fee is adopted, it would be conceivable to think they may
want to increase the inspection frequency or length, after all the
businesses would be paying for the inspections.
justify a fee increase.

What better way to

Let's make sure the people who are getting th

benefit are paying for the service.

If the public wants or needs

inspections then they will have to be willing to pay the price with the
taxes.

This is upfront and above board, not another -hidden tax which

the business, if it wants to do business in Salt Lake County, has to pa
Then the businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing business
to their customers, through higher prices.

The business takes the

blame for the increase, and the people who are really paying for these
government services have no understanding or knowledge of what they are
really paying for.

If the health department needs additional revenue

then they need to go through the proper budgfetting process with the citj
and county and justify their need to the elected officials and public.

GOO'-C^

UTAH HOTEL MOTEL
ASSOCIATION

9/10/86
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I

HAVE

A

STATEMENT

TO

READ

HOTEL MOTEL ASSOCIATION; I

AM

ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE UTAH
JULIE

PECK,

THE

ADMINISTRATIVE

ASSISTANT THERE.

WE

ARE OPPOSED TO ANY COLLECTION OF FEES FOR HEALTH INSPECTIONS.

WE FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE COUNTY WOULD REQUIRE PERIOD INSPECTION*
OF

OUR

RESTAURANTS, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND CHARGE US FOR THAT

INSPECTION...PARTICULARLY SINCE WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE COST THROUGH
THE

FEES FOR FOOD HANDLERS PERMITS, BUSINESS LICENTES, AND TAXES

COLLECTED.

AS AN INDUSTRY WE ARE BEING SINGLED OUT ARE ALL OTHER

BUSINESSES

WHICH

REQUIRE

INSPECTIONS

GOING

TO

BE ASKED TO PAY FOR THOSE. OR JUST THE FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY?

IN

ANY

CASE,

WE

CONCUR

THAT THIS IS UNFAIR AND

WITH

THE UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION

DISCRIMINATORY.

AND

WE

IS NECESSARY TO SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE.

APriUATEO WITH

M^

E^CAN HOTEL & r W f t l
EL ASSOCIATION M
Li

WILL

DO

UHAT

The proposed annual fees for Inspection of foodservlie and food-related establishments
©re just another example of government singling out a particular industry to solve an in-hous
budget problem.

The issue goes far beyond the size of the fee Itself and far beyond the

proposal in Salt Lake County. . /This issue has statewide Impact since other Utah counties
will follow suit by levying their own fees.

We oppose the fee for a major reason.

The URA has traditionally supported the concept of [health Inspections as an essential
service to the public.

These Inspections do nothing to help restauranteurs in the operation o

their business; rather, the whole purpose of these Inspections which are required by Utah law
is to help protect the public from food-borne Illness.

If such a service is so essential that i

is required by law for a general public purpose, then that service should be financed through
general funds, not a specific fee penalizing the restaurantfeur.
in my restaurant, I do so for my own protection.

If I Install a security device

It will be silly for me to charge other

restaurants or businesses for the cost of my own security system, since it benefits me and I
should pay for it.

It would be equally silly for me to expect a tax credit since the system

would lessen demands on the local police force.
fees:

The same reasoning applies to the proposed

If public services are for the benefit of the public and, In f a c t , required by law, then

financing should come from public funds.
In addition, health departments already receive special monies to offset the costs of
inspections.

Our employees are required by law to pay for food handler's permits.

How ma

other businesses are regulated to the extent that their employees must pay the government
in order to acquire work?

We are already one of the most regulated businesses in the count

and we pay a variety of special taxes, assessments and fees on equipment and menu items.
The fees pile up, and yet, according to a recent Mational Restaurant Association survey, the
profit of an average restaurant is less than 3%.

Additional fees and taxes will only reduce

this percentage while having no positive impact on business.
If this proposal is adopted, what will we see next?
charge us special fees for fire protection?

Will counties and mur icipalities soc

Will we see special fees for police protection?

Since some restaurants receive a high traffic volume, will these firms be assessed a special f
for highway and road improvement?

Everytime there is a budget crunch, will a government i

rush in to assess a special fee or tax?

And how high will the fee go?

As businessmen we

know that a fee of $60 today will soon be increased to $100, then $150, whatever amount is
needed to solve the government's problem.
Restaurants are shown to have one of the highest rates of business failure, and the last
thing government should do Is start Increasing taxes by disguising them as a special f e e .

If

there is a budgetary problem within the health department, then that department should eithc
obtain more funding from the general public or tighten It* own financial belt.
needs more money, he or she works harder or becomes mj)re productive.

If an individuc

We believe that

the health department should do the same.

OUO'-G

RESTAURANT

MAX FILLMORE, PRESIDENT OF UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION. FEAD A

FEES

STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION.

THAT STATEMENT IS

ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT A, AND BY REFERENCE MADE A FART
HEREOF.

MR. FILLMORE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE FEELS THE

r

INSPECTION FEE SCHEDULE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE.

R0r03ED
HE DID NOT

FEEL DETAILED SPECIFICS WERE MADE AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE
FEE SCHEDULE, AND SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR Tnr FEES,
BUT IF THEY ARE NECESSARY, THE SOURCE FOR THOSE FUNDS SHOULD PC
THE GENERAL TAX FUND AND NOT FROM FEES OR FROM THE T A U A Y E R S .
MR. FILLMORE STATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, L E G I S L A T E ; .
TAXPAYERS, THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND THE AREA COUNCIL DC NOT
FEEL FEES ARE NECESSARY.

MR. FILLMORE REPRESENTED THAT

SENATOR

HAVEN BARLOW STATED THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE IN 2 6 - 2 4 - H , UCA, TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE FOR FEE
COLLECTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REVIEW THAT SECTION FOR
CLARIFICATION.

MR. FILLMORE MENTIONED THAT NONE OF THE BOARD

MEMBERS WERE PRESENT FOR THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD SEFTEMPER 10,
1986, AND HE QUESTIONED HOW THEY COULD, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, VOTE
ON A PROPOSAL THAT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY DISCUSSED.

GARY ATKIN, ATTORNEY FOR UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATIOH, STATED
THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPROACH TAKEN ON IMPOSITION OF
FEES.

HE DID NOT FEEL BOARD MEMBERS WERE AWARE OF THE FEELINGS

OF RESTAURANT OWNERS AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE FEES AT THIS
STAGE.

norzT

nnn-.

GENERAL DISSATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PUBLIC
HEARING.

MR. ATKIN STATEO THAT THERE WAS HO BACKGROUND

INFORMATION DISCUSSED, AND NO ONE REALLY ANSWERED THE QUESTION
WHY FEES NEEDED TO BE IMPOSED.

THIS INSPECTION SHOULD PE PAID

FDR BY TAXES OR TAKEN OUT OF THE BUDGET.

NOTHING WAS STATED AS

TO WHY THE AMOUNT OF FEES WERE NECESSARY, NOR HDW THE FEES WERE
DETERMINED.

MR. ATKIN CITED A COMPARISON BETWEEN FEES FOR DAY

CARE AND NURSING HOMES, AND RESTAURANTS.

THE QUESTION was AS>ED

HOW THE COST TO THE RESTAURANT WAS DETERMINED.

FOR EXAMPLE,

WHAT IS THE DIFERENCE BETWEEN A RESTAURANT WITH ONE CASH
REGISTER AND 10 TABLES AND A RESTAURANT WITH TWO CASH REGISTERS
AND 10 TABLES.

HOW IS THAT FEE DETERMINED?

MR. A T U N STATED

THAT NONE OF THESE FACTORS HAD BEEN PRESENTED AT THIS 5TAGE.

THE HEARING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOWING THE HEARING.
FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED.

NOME OF THE NEGATIVE

THE IDEA OF A PUBLIC HEAFING IS

TO CONSIDER ALL THESE THINGS AND LET PEOPLE ASK QUESTIONS, BUT
THE ONLY THING THEY WERE TOLD WAS THAT FEES WOULD TE IMF03ED.
THE QUESTION, "WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT''" SHOULD HAVE
BEEN ASKED.

MR. ATKIN STATED THAT THE FEE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND THE ACTION
TAKEN WAS QUESTIONABLE.

HE STATED THEY HAD BEEN THROUGH THIS

WITH DAVIS COUNTY, AND RE50RTED TO THE COURT TO SETTLE THE
ISSUE, AND HE REALIZES THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS AN ACVI30P JUST
AS DAVIS COUNTY DID, AND WE WANT TO BE SURE AND -HE WANT TO BEND
OVER BACKWARDS AND MAKE SURE THAT WE| HAVE CROSSED OUR Ts AND

DOTTED OUR Is".

WE NEED TO BE SURE WHERE THE FEES ARE GOING TO

GO AND WHAT TO EXPECT SO THERE IS NO APPEAL TO THE 5UFREME COURT.

BILL DAVIS STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE CONCERN OF THE
RESTAURANT OWNERS, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAD GONE THROUGH THE
PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE NEED AS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED COSTS IN
THE PROGRAM AND STILL FELT THE HEED TO SUPPLEMENT THROUGH FEES.

THIS IS A MANDATORY PROGRAM THAT IS DONE SIMILAR TO THE
ASBESTOS PROGRAM.

ADOPTION OF FEES AS A PART OF REGULA T IONS

DATES BACK TO 19B1 WHEN FEES WERE INSTITUTED FOR SOLID WASTE.
SINCE THAT TIME FEES HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTITUTED FOR OTHER
INSPECTIONS.

MR. DAVIS STATED THE CONCEPT IS THAT FUNDING

SHOULD COME FROM GENERAL TAXES, BUT IF THAT WILL NOT SUFFORT
PROGRAMS, THE USER FEE IS A REASONABLE WAY TO HELF SUPPORT THE
COST OF THE PROGRAM.

WE BELIEVE THOSE COSTS WILL BE C O P I E D

THROUGH TO THE CONSUMER FOR USE OF SERVICE.

AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE, STAFF FELT THE FEE WAS VERY
REASONABLE AND DETERMINED NOT TO GO FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE
COST OF THE PROGRAM BEING SUPPORTED BY THE FEE.

A PCRTIOH OF

THE FEE WAS BUDGETARILY ACCEPTABLE TO THE STAFF, AND THE
RESTAURANT CAN PASS THE FEE ON TO THE CONSUMER.

STAFF DID MAKE AN EFFORT TO GAIN INPUT.

THIRTY DAYS WERE

ALLOWED FOR COMMENTS PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC HEARING.

THE PROPOSED FEE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE BOARD, AND AN EFFORT

HAS HADE TO GAIN INPUT AS FART OF THE PUBLIC HEARING FRQwESS.

STAFF FELT THEY HAD FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELINES WHICH
OUTLINED PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED.

A SPECIFIC ACCOUNT

HAS INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET AND THE FEE HILL BE ALLOCATED TO THAT
I

ACCOUNT.

RECORDS HILL BE KEPT TO S;HOW HHERE FEE COLLECTIONS GO

AND WHAT THE FUNDS ARE SPENT FOR.

DR. BEVAN ASKED I F STAFF KNEW HOW MUCH HONEY THIS FEE WOULD
RAISE, HOH MUCH THE SERVICE COSTS, AND WHAT PORTION OF THE COST
WOULD BE RAISED THROUGH FEE COLLECTION.

DR. GIBBOUS RESPONDED

THAT FEES HOULD PRODUCE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF THE COST OF THE
PROGRAM.
FEES.

ALL OTHER PROGRAMS ARE APJPROXIMATELY 507. FUNDED BY

A FEE IS CHARGED FOR IMMUNIZATIONS,

AND THE

INSPECTION

AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS TOTALLY SUPPORTED BY FEES.

TAMARA HHARTON STATED THAT THE FEE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF
RISING COSTS AND LOSS OF FEDERAL MONEY.

SHE FELT IT WAS

UNFORTUNATE THAT A TASK FORCE WAS NOT SET UP TO STUDY T H I S ,
REVIEW OF THE MATERIAL REVEALED THAT CALIFORNIA,
NEBRASKA HAVE CHARGED FEES FOR YEARS.

BUT

NEVADA AND

PEOPLE ARE PEALLV FED UP

WITH BEING TAXED AND TAXED, AMD SHE FEELS THERE SHOULD BE A
FEE.

THERE WERE SOME CONCERNS EXPRESSED THAT THE FEE WOULD

SKYROCKET, BUT DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT STAFF WORKS CLOSELY WITH
j

THE BOARD, AND COULD NOT INCREASE THE FEE WITHOUT BOARD
APPROVAL.

RON MORGAN, UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION,

STATED THE BASIC

OBJECTION OF THE ASSOCIATION WAS THEY ARE TOLD THE HEALTH
DEPARTMENT IS COMING TO INSPECT OUR RESTAURANTS AND THEY
THEREFORE FEEL THE COST SHOULD BE PAID FROM THE GENERAL FUND.
IF WE LOOK BACK HISTORICALLY, WE FIND FEES START OUT VEFY SMALL
AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPAND.

THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION

IS NOT

ONLY LOOKING AT TODAY, BUT FIVE TO TEN YEARS FROM TODAY.

IF

HEALTH IS INSPECTING AT OUR REQUEST, THEY SHOULD CHARGE US.

TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATE SENATE WERE PRESENT AT THE HEARING AND
BOTH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE IUTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
PROVIDE FOR FEES.

THE INTENT WAS TO CHARGE THOSE FEO^LE WHO

COME AND PROVIDE A SERVICE FOR MYSELF OR MY FAMILY.
POINT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CHARGE A FEE.

AT THAT

MR. MORGAN FELT THE

HEALTH DEPARTMENT STAFF CONVEYED THE IDEA, "WE REALLY DON'T CARE
WHAT YOU GUYS SAY".

THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION WENT TO THE

SUPREME COURT ABOUT THESE ISSUES, AND IF THE BOARD OF HEALTH
IMPOSES THIS FEE,THE ASSOCIATION WILL GO BACK TO THE SUPREME
COURT ON THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES.

THE LEGISLATURE,

IN JANUARY, WILL SAY IT WAS NOT OUR INTENT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN.

DOUGLAS SMITH COMMENTED THAT MR. MORGAN'S SUPPOSITION

MCO'JT

WHAT

THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATURE WOULD DO WAS GUESTIMATE AT
BEST, AND HE DID NOT FEEL THAT SUPPOSITION APFLIED TO THE
ADOPTION OF THIS FEE.

A QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT THE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESTAURANT ORGANIZATIONS AND A BANK.

A

BANK IS EXAMINED REGULARLY AND IS REGULATED FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE DEPOSITOR.

MR. MORGAN COUNTERED THAT BANCS ARE EXAMINED

IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE.

BANKS ARE EXAMINED

AND PAY A FEE TO PROTECT THE DEFOStTORS TO MAKE SURE THE
DEPOSITS ARE SECURED.

RESTAURANTS SHOULD BE INSPECTED TO MAKE

CERTAIN THAT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN ARE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
PUBLIC.

MR. MORGAN CITED A RECENT CONTACT KITH THE STATE

REGARDIN6 SUMMIT SAVINGS.

BANKS ARE EXAMINED SO THEY CAM

OUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE.

THIS IS FOR THE PROTECTION OF

THE DEPOSITORS.

MR. MORGAN STATED THAT THEY WANTED TO CLARIFY TWO OR THREE
POINTS THAT DID NOT GET THROUGH AT THE PUBLIC HEARING.

DICK BOLLARD STATED THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS MANDATED TO PERFORM
INSPECTIONS AND RECEIVES FEES FROM OTHER PROGRAMS, AND IT DOES
NOT SEEM THAT HEALTH IS SINGLING OUT THE RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION.

MR. BOLLARD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SUPREME COURT

RULING AGAINST DAVIS COUNTY WAS ON A TECHNICALITY RESULTING FROM
A PROCEDURAL ERROR.

THE INTENT TO COLLECT FEES WAS NOT REALLY

OBJECTED TO IN THAT ACTION.

PAUL MC CLURE STATED THAT HE COULD FEEL FOR THE RESTAURANT
ASSOCIATION BECAUSE HE OPERATES A BUSINESS AND COSTS A^.E VERY
CRITICAL TO BUSINESSMEN.

AN ORGANIZATION TO WHICH HE BELONGS

RECENTLY VOTED ON THE ISSUE OF FEES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL.

MR.

MC CLURE DIRECTED THAT THE RECORD SHOW THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO
USER FEES, AND THAT HE FEELS AS A GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY, WE
HAVE GONE OVERBOARD IN REGULATIONS AND ASSESSING FEES.

UPON MOTION OF DR. JOHN SEVAN, THE

BOARD VOTED TO ACCEFT THE
RECOflMENDATIONS TO INSTITUTE USER
FEES FOR RESTAURANT

INSPECTIONS.

MR. MC CLURE OPPOSED THE MOTION.
CINDY GUST-JENSON ABSTAINED FROM.
THE VOTE.

SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department Carries out responsibilities
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24.
2. Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to
carry out its responsibility.
3.

On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret
News at'least 15 days prior to the public hearing.

4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on
October 2, 1986.
5. While objection was raised by several individuals as to the charging
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program
and to be used to support this cost.
6. The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees.
7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County
He?lth Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler permits total
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees
totals $430,000.
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, which is
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program.
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of
the Health fund set up specifically to receivp monies generated by the
proposed standard.
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the
account mentioned above in Item #9.

-2The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are
legal and meet the Intent of Section 26-24-14. Therefore, the Board adopts
the fees standard as attached this
2nd
day of
October
, 1986.

L. OecTTionHson, M.D., Chairman
Salt Lajce City-County Board of Health

EXHIBIT
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STAFF RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AT THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD
SEPTEMBER 10, 1986
This paper combines and summarizes the comments made at the
hearing related to the proposed food service inspection fees and
gives the response of the Health Department staff to these comments:
COMMENT:

The food service industry is barely making a profit.
This fee will cause a detrimental effect en profits and
a loss of business and jobs.

STAFF RESPONSE:

The staff was reas onable in the amounts proposed for the
fee standard. The maximum amount to be charged is
$100.00 per year f or Category IV or Category V establishments, which have 76 or more ieats or 5,COO or more
square feet of flo or space. At the most, this amount
figures to be. $1.3 2 per seat or two cents a square foot,
To be even more re alistic, we estimate that the annual
fee would cost a f raction of one cent per meal served.
At the rates propo sed, we believe the fee will not bea significant detr iment in lost profits, business or
jobs.

COMMENT:

The purpose of the inspection is to protect the public;
therefore, the burden of cost should be born by the
public and the general tax. Tax increases should come
from the regular budget process.

STAFF RESPONSE:

It is true the purpose of the food service inspection
is to protect the public but in this case, as it is in
many other cases, it is not the general public that is
causing the threat of foodborne illness. The -public1'
creating the potential problem should carry primary
responsibility to prevent it. We believe, however, support for the fee will ultimately come from the general
public or customers of food establishments as the cost
is passed on to them through the meals or food purchased,
As James V. Olsen, President of that Utah Retail Grocers
Association/ stated in his hearing comments, "...the
businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing
business to their customers through higher prices". The
cost that will be passed on will be minute.
If it was the intent of the Utah State Legislature thru
the Local Health Department Act Section 26-24-16 that
only general tax dollars be the source of funding for
local health departments, it appears
they are creating
a contradiction in Section 26-24-14(14). If Section
26-24-14(14) was intended only for the establishment of
fees where a direct benefit is received (e.g., fee for
a birth certificate), it does not so state, and, if the

WO'

legislature decides to clarify this law and limit fees
only to direct benefit, it will make it necessary for
local health departments to shift the source .of funding
to the property tax.
If this shift causes an increase
in property tax, the public would be opposed, even more
so than the imposition of a fee.
An editorial in the Salt Lake Tribune reflects the
staff's point of view and we believe the point of view
of the public. A copy is attached.
All efforts to obtain a budget increase through the
regular budget process have been exhausted, although we
never dismiss this alternative in evaluating our programs. The County Commission feels they have received
a clear public mandate that property taxes not be raised.
ENT:

A special group of businesses have been singled out, are
required to be inspected and then are charged for the
inspection.

F RESPONSE;

The current philosophy and intent of the County Commission, where possible, is to have each program support
itself. The trend not only in Salt Lake County and Utah,
but nationwide is to have fees support each program and
have these programs supported either by those being regulated or those using the service. In establishing this
basis, the food service industry is not being singled
out. Permit or inspection fees have already been established within the department for asbestos control, massage establishments, barber and beauty shops, swimming
pools, solid waste haulers and facilities, septic tank
inspections, and tattoo establishments. There is a fee
schedule in the tanning facility regulations which is
now going through the public comment process. Consistency from the public point of view and the point of view
of those already charged for a fee would dictate that
the food industry should also assume part of the cost.

:NT:

RESPONSE:

Rather than impose a fee, the department should increase
efficiency, be creative in effectiveness and tighten its
belt.
The department has always and will continue to seek and
adopt efficiencies prior to seeking budget increases.
The department's reputation is clear that its budget submitted each year is a "bare bones" budget. In 1970, Salt
Lake County's population was 480,152. In 1986, it has
increased to over 700,000. Food establishments have
increased 5-85 per year and now totals 3,000. The
National Environmental Health Association recommends an
average workload of 150 food establishments per sanitarian. Our workload is 250.

With this remarkable increase in workload, the Food Protection Program has not had an increase in staff in the
past 10 years. Rather, the excellence of the-program
has been maintained through efficiencies and creative
management. A number of efficiencies were.created with
the computerized "SPIFM (Sanitation Program Information
Formulator) Program. This program provides timely and
meaningful data for each sanitarian. Food establishments
that receive a low score receive greater attention and
more frequent inspections, data is easily collected,
tabulated and reported, inspection patterns and scores
are readily available, and time sequences for reinspections are determined. Other efforts to "tighten our
belt" have included cutting the inspection program for
preschools and nursing homes and not picking up inspections of group homes, hourly day care facilities,
extended care facilities and halfway houses.
As an alternative to the department training all food
handlers, a food establishment has the option of having
its manager trained and the manager, in turn, training
his employees. Unfortunately, few food establishments
have implemented their own tralining program.
Other agencies, both in and out of county government,
have reviewed the department and its individual programs.
Those reviews may be summed up in a statement in a March,
1986, report by the Utah Foundation. It states, "Expenditures of the Salt Lake City-fCounty Health Division in
1984 appear significantly less than expenditures of 1974,
if the 1974 figures are adjusted for inflation and the
increased number of people served. Over the same period,
health services appear to hav$ approximately doubled.".
COMMENT:

The fee is an unfair tax and tax increase. The food
industry already pays taxes, license fees, and food
handler permits to support the Food Protection budget.

STAFF RESPONSE:

The inspection fee is not a tax and it is not unfair or
hidden. Authority to establish the fee is based on
Section 26-24-14(14) of the Utah Code Annotated (Local
Health Department Act). An individual often does not
know what is included in his tax statement, where the
taxes are going and how they are being spent. The food
inspection fee on the other hand is a specific amount,
the payer of the fee knows what it is for and should see
a direct result. The fee is earmarked and can be spent
for no other purpose. There is a specific accounting
and auditing procedure set upj to handle the fee and
determine its efficiency.
Even though the food service industry pays other taxes,
those taxes are not intended to cover the costs of the

Health Department. License fees defray the cost of oth
municipal and county agencies, but no license fee money
goes to the Health Department. Food handler^permit fee
are not paid by the food establishment. They are paid
by the individual employee when he/she attends the clas
COMMENT:

Imposing this fee will set a precedent that other healtl
departments will follow. Tried in Davis County and los

STAFF RESPONSE:

Imposing a permit or inspection fee to cover the costs
of the department is not a new precedent. It has alreac
been in practice several other programs within our
Department and by other local health departments. Five
local health departments, including Tooele County, Bear
River District, Southeastern Health District, Wasatcn
County and Utah County, have set fees. The fees we have
set are comparable to those being proposed in these othe
jurisdictions considering the size of the department and
number of establishments in each jurisdiction.
To say that the courts have ruled that a fee cannot be
imposed because of the Davis County attempt is incorrect
That attempt failed because specific legal procedures
were not followed in establishing the fee. Fees can be
imposed if the legal procedures are followed. The Utah
State Supreme Court ruled that in promulgating a fee,
standard findings of fact should be entered that are
comprehensive enough to allow determination if the fees
have been designed and collected to actually defray some
or all of the costs of inspecting food service establishments. The Board of Health and the staff are following
these legal procedures.

ZOMMENT:

Once the fee is imposed, it will escalate and continue
to increase.

5TAFF RESPONSE:

To assume the fee will not increase and to be a continuec
source of helping defray inspection cost in unrealistic.
However, it should be kept in mind that the Health
Department's practice of not increasing fees has been
outstanding. A case in point is the milk inspection fee
which has not increased in the past 8 years. In setting
food inspection fees, any subsequent increases will be
by the Board of Health and not the staff. The Board has
always been sensitive to the needs of those affected by
the fee increase.

Thursday Morning, September 23,1982
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Food Service Inspection Fees
Are Necessary Health Step
In the area of public health
protection, food service inspection
should have top priority. There are
more reported outbreaks of disease
associated with food consumption
than from all other environmental
causes combined, according to the
Utah State Health Department.
But inspection staffs in the state's
12 health districts historically have
been grossly understaffed due to lack
of funds. The result has been fewer
inspections of public eating establishments, sometimes only once a year
rather than the legally-required once
every six months, particularly in
multi-county districts where great
travel distances are involved.
In a 1972 survey, 45 percent of the
food service outlets in Utah were
rated "inadequate" and, by law,
could have been ordered closed for
health reasons. A Bureau of Sanitation survey just completed shows
significant improvement overall, but
restaurants scored worse than
schools or taverns.
The national formula for adequate
health protection is one sanitarian
per 15,000 population. On that basis,
Utah is 41 sanitarians short. Davis
County now has only five and should
have 11.
To help defray the cost of inspections and build up the program, Davis
County Department of Health has
taken a long-needed step of charging
public food outlets a modest annual
service fee. The Utah Restaurant
Association is fighting the action,
seeking a court injunction.
The Davis County move stems from
tightened state purse strings in recent
years and follows a course outlined by
the legislature.
The burgeoning budget of the Utah
Department of Health the past de-

cade, necesiitated by growing state
and federal demands on it, was
deeply slashed below requests the
past two general sessions. So deeply
the previous health director resigned
in protest that the department's
mandatory responsibilities could not
be earned out with the reduced
appropriations. It was a case of slash
vital services and the public be
damned or assess fees to maintain
them.
In response, the legislature in 19S1
authorized the health department to
charge for publications and services
previously provided free. In protesting the Davis County fees, the
executive director of the restaurant
association contends it was not the
' legislature's intent to include restaurants in a fee system. But they are not
exempted in the new law. It states
broadly that "the department may
adopt a schedule of fees that may be
assessed for services rendered by the
department, provided that such fees
shall be reasonable and fair . . . "
The Davis County schedule appears reasonable and fair, fees based
on si2e and number of operating days
annually, expected to cost each
eating establishment between $15
and $60 a year. That should impose no
hardship on restaurant owners.
There is| ample precedent in
charging the private sector for public
services their activities necessitate.
Builders pay for septic tank inspections and other services. Industry
pays for health department review of
pollution control plans. The dairy
business pays inspection fees.
,The new restaurant fees are an
appropiate investment in public
health. The inspection program is
essential and should be brought up to
full strength rather than drift ir*:o
neglect through lack of money.

SALT LAKE C I T Y - C O U N T Y BOARD OF HEALTH MEETING
A U D I T O R I U M , SALT LAKE C I T Y - C O U N T Y H E A L T H DEPARTMENT
610 S O U T H 200 EAST
S A L T L A K E C I T Y , UTAH

JUNE 5, 19B6 - 7:30

STAFF:

PRESENT:
L. Jed M o r r i s o n , M. D.
Chai m a n
John M. Bevan, D . D . S.
Richard Bollard
Janet R. Green
Linda Hamilton
Cindy G u s t - J e n s o n
Paul W. M c C l u r e
R. Todd Neilson
Craig E. Peterson
Rulon Simfions, M . D .
D o u g l a s H. Saith

EXCUSED:
Stewart

Jan

Green

Harold

Linda
Bill
Karen
Stan
David

Chris Segura
Nick Barber
Roger C h e u r o n t
Lloyd Mitchell
Dan Druftiler

Coemendatlon to

Kent Fitzgerald
Terry Sadler
W i 1 1 i a a L. Davis
Jeff T h r o c k a o r t o n
Kent R. Miner
Jia L i b b e r t o n
Bill Irvine
Verla Hancock
Colleen Archie
Iliana Merri11
Beverly Thornley

Schreiber

VISITORS:

VISITORS:

Minutes

Harry L. G i b b o n s , M.D,

EXCUSED:

C a a m r . D. Michael
Dale Gardiner

TOPIC

A.M.

3I5CUSSIQN

Wilcox
Duke
Hoggan
Christiansen
Bird

ACTION
Upon aotion of Douglas H. S n a t h ,
seconded by Richard Bollard, the
M i n u t e s for the aeeting held May 1,
19B6, were u n a n i a o u s l y a p p r o v e d .

A c e r t i f i c a t e and R e s o l u t i o n were presented to Janet R. Green for
her c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the Board during the tiee she served.
Mrs.
Green is Moving out of s t a t e .

-3-

b e m q regulated by State and Federal Law, and the c o m p a n i e s already comply
those r e g u l a t i o n s . Mr, Bird c o m p l i m e n t e d the Board in their efforts in
developing the R e g u l a t i o n s .

with

Upon a c t i o n of Richard Bollard, seconded
by D o u g l a s S m i t h , the Board u n a n i m o u s l y
voted to accept the proposed changes and
adopt A s b e s t o s R e g u l a t i o n s . Staff will
be required to present an annual report
to the B o a r d .
Food
Establishment
Li censing
Fees

Terry Sadler r e p o r t e d that a few y e a r s ago restaurant fees were
d i s c u s s e d , but no action Mas taken b e c a u s e Utah R e s t a u r a n t
A s s o c i a t i o n filed a lawsuit. The District Court suit was
appealed to the Utah S u p r e m e C o u r t , and a ruling was handed down
that Davis County did not follow protocol with their public
h e a r i n g . The court did not rule on f e e s . C a l i f o r n i a , Nevada
and T e x a s , as well as other s t a t e s , already charge f e e s .
Mr.
Sadler c i r c u l a t e d an information sheet which listed v a r i o u s
c a t e g o r i e s , d e f i n i t i o n s , and r e s p e c t i v e fees for the named
categories.
Staff met with Mr. Ron Morgan of Utah Restaurant A s s o c i a t i o n and
Mr. Jim Olson of Utah Retail G r o c e r s A s s o c i a t i o n to d i s c u s s a
user f e e . Every food e s t a b l i s h m e n t that is inspected should be
charged a r e a s o n a b l e f e e . Mr. Sadler estimated cost of food
i n s p e c t i o n s to be a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 . Health p r e s e n t l y
g e n e r a t e s a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , but it is anticipated that
$ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 could be generated if c o l l e c t i o n of fees were to be
instituted.
Dr. John Bevan stated he felt i n s p e c t i o n s of food
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s was very a p p r o p r i a t e and that a fee should be
charged.
Upon motion
seconded by
unanimously
hearing for

of Dr. John Bevan,
Jan G r e e n , the Board
voted to approve a public
restaurant inspection fees.

Inspection of food dispensed through vending machines was also
discussed.
Those foods are inspected at the packaging site.
D o u g l a s Smith inquired about food handling and sanitation in
those i n s t a n c e s w h e r e c o r p o r a t i o n s , p a r t n e r s h i p s and c o m p a n i e s
invite c l i e n t s to their e s t a b l i s h m e n t and serve food, but are
not really set up to handle g r o u p s .
Is dishwashing a d e q u a t e , and
is s a n i t a t i o n by those handling the food a d e q u a t e ?
He feels
these e s t a b l i s h m e n t s should also be subject to food i n s p e c t i o n s .
Dr. G i b b o n s stated this would be a matter for future
c o n s i d e r a t i o n by the Food Division

.r
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"
Increases

Kent F i t z g e r a l d c i r c u l a t e d i n f o r m a t i o n relating tc proposed
i n c r e a s e s in f e e s . The information included • d e s c r i p t i o n of the
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Dear Board Member:
On Wednesday, September 10, 1986, we held a public hearing
and completed a 30-day comment period on the Proposed Food Establishment Inspection Fees, I am enclosing, for your review, the
following:
1.

A copy of the proposed Fee Standards.

2.

Minutes of the public hearing (copies of the written comments
submitted at the hearing are available upon request).

3.

A draft copy of the conclusions of law and findings of fact
that are necessary as part of the rule-making process.

4.

An outline of the issues raised by those making comments
and staff response to those comments.

The impression I received from some of the comments leads
me to believe that there are many individuals who do not understand the great effort we have made to maintain an efficient and
effective food protection program, including the efforts our
Fiscal Committee who reviews our programs, sets priorities and
insure tax dollars are spent wisely.
We can be proud of our Food Protection Program. It serves
a vital public health need in Salt Lake County and has been an
exemplary program, not only for Utah, but is so recognized in
many areas of the United States. Filling the existing need has
not been easy. We have maintained excellence, but we feel we
have economized to the point public health may be jeopardized.
We have not had an increase in food protection staff in the past
10 years, yet today we inspect 3,000 food establishments compared
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to 2,000 that existed 12 years ago. The past few years we have
been experiencing a 5-8% growth rate in establishments, not
taking into account the increase and workload created by temporary events such as the Utah Arts Festival, neighborhood fairs,
holiday parades and celebrations and other mass gatherings.
During the 1970*s, 30C of every food dollar spent was in a food
establishment. During the 1980*5 this figure has risen to 40C
and by 1990 is expected to rise to 50C. Last year, because of
improper food handling at a single event, there was a confirmed
foodborne illness affecting 300 people. The threat of foodborne
illness is ever present.
Our efforts as a health department to economize and become
more efficient will continue. As I have stated in recent Board
Meetings, however, I strongly feel the need for this inspection
fee to be adopted so the maintenance of an excellent program may
continue. Please review the enclosed documents carefully. If
you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please contact
me.
Sincerely,

HLG/WLD/bc
Enclosures

GOO'-b

G a r y E. A t k i n , E s q .
A t t o r n e y s for
Plaintiffs
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
Telephone:
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 2 5 52

400

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

DISTRICT

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION,
a Utah n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n ,
et a l . ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintitfs,
C i v i l No. C86-9U24
(JUDGE MOFFAT)

v.
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY
BOARD OF HEALTH,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

regularly

for

hearing

before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge,

presiding;

and

plaintiffs

being

represented

by

their

counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney;

and

the parties

having

submitted

the matter

to the

Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination;
both

parties

Authorities

having

and

submitted

Reply Memoranda

their

Memoranda

of

in support of their

Points

and

respective

positions; and the matter having been fully argued to the Court;
and

the

Court

having

reviewed

the

Memoranda, as well

as

the

pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues, and otlier

'W-

documents filed of record; and the Court now being fully informed
in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FkCT
1.
Utah

Plaintiff associations, the Utal) Restaurant Association,
Retail

Association,
existing

Grocer's
are

under

principal

places

Association,

non-profit
the
of

laws

and

corporations,

of

business

the
in

State
Salt

Utah
duly

of

Lake

Hotel-Motel

organized

Utah,

and

with

their

and

whose

County,

memberships are composed of persons, corporations, partnerships,
and

other

entities

engaged

in, associated

with,

or

having

a

direct interest in the restaurant and

food service industry in

the state of Utah, whose memberships

includes numerous persons

whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, and which
are subject
Fee

to the

Standards'*

Each of

(the

"Food Service/Food
" fee

standard")

those associations

Establishment Licensing

involved

m

is a person within

this action.

the meaning

of

Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, Section? 78-33-1, et seq., Utah
Code

Anno.

Rulemaking

(1953),
Act,

as

Section

(1953), as amended.

amended,

and

63-46a-l,

et

Each plaintiff

Utah's
seq.,

Administrative

Utah

is entitled

Code

Anno.

to the relief

sought under those Acts.
2.

The remaining plaintiffs are also persons subject to,

and whose legal relations are affected by, the fee standard and
are persons within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act,
Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno, (1953)# as amended, as

2

well

as within

the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section

63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno, (1953), as amended.
3-

The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the "Board")

is a non-elected body, appointed by the Salt Lake City and County
Commissioners

to act as a local board of health pursuant to the

provisions of Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
as amended,

which provisions

specify

the statutory

powers and

duties of the Board.
4.
is

The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit and

subject

pursuant

to

to

the

Sections

jurisdiction
63-46a-13,

and

process

Utah

Code

of

Anno.

this

Court,

(1953),

as

amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as
amended.
5.

This is an action brought by plaintiffs pursuant to the

provisions of the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure,

validity

and

for

a

declaratory

constitutionality

of

judgment
the

to determine

"Food

the

Service/Food

Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by the Board.
6.

The exhibits attached to the Stipulation of the parties,

as subsequently supplemented by the parties, reflect all meetings
of
anu

the Board relative to the fee standard and the times, places
purposes ot

those meetings, as well as all actions taken,

comments made, and other input presented at those meetings, and
all notices thereof, which were considered in the formulation of
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to
the adoption of the fee standard.
3

7.
items

Except as referred to in Paragraph 6, there are no other
of

testimony,

documents,

papers,

Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions of Law, or Orders ot the Board regarding the proposal
and adoption of the tee standard.
8.

The

inspections

contemplated

in

the

fee

standara

constitute no change trom the inspections previously conducted,
except that previous inspections were paid with Health Department
funds.
9.

Fees collected by defendant pursuant to the fee standard

have not been expended

but have been deposited

into a Health

Department fund and are rerlected, for bookkeeping purposes, as a
credit

to a

separate discretionary

Health

Department account,

which does not reflect deposits from any other source.

Defendant

intended that this account would be used to pay for a portion of
the food inspection program or, if the court should so direct, to
provide a refund to the persons making the payments.
10.

The dollar amounts, categories and detinitions applied

in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards11
were

prepared

and

adopted

Health Department staff.

based

upon

recommendations

ot

the

The Board made its determination, based

upon the recommendations of staff and its own deliDerations, that
the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable.
There

was

no

public

input

regarding

those

dollar

amounts,

categories and definitions.

4

000''--

11.

There are no existing genuine issues as to any material

fact relevant to this action which would require an evidentiary
hearing.
BASED UPON the foregoing

Findings of Fact, the Court does

hereby make and order the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
as

Defendant does not have the authority to impose charges

specified

in

Fee Standards'1

the "Food Service/Food

Establishment Licensing

for food service establishments pursuant to the

provisions of Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953),
or

otherwise.

refers

only

preparing

Section

to

26-24-14

the charging

certificates,

specific

services

to

of

(14), Utah
fees

copying

fees,

particular

Code Anno.

for such
and

persons

minor

similar
for

their

(1953)

items as
fees

for

specific

benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by governmental
bodies.
offset
salaries

The statute does not authorize defendant to attempt to
substantial
and

portions

overhead

of

involved

in

excess

of

total

costs,

including

in particular programs, through

the imposition of such charges.
acting

its

Therefore, since defendant was

its statutory

authority

in attempting

to

impose those charges, they should be declared to be invalid, and
null and void ab initio.
2.
by

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted

defendant

are unsupported

by

the evidence presented at the

public hearing of September 10, 1986, relative to the adoption of
its "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" for
5

food

service

defendant

establishments.

While

the Court

recognizes

that

is not bound by the evidence presented at such public

hearings, the Findings of Fact mandated by Section 26-24-1, et
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), should have some support in the
evidence

so presented.

Therefore,

the

standard

imposing

the

charges should be declared invalid, and r^ull and void ab initio.
3.

The provisions of the "Food Service/Food

Licensing

Fee

authorized

Standards"

amount

to a tax.

Establishment

The Board

is not

to levy taxes and, therefore, the standard should be

declared to be invalid, and null and void ab initio.
4.
the

Any charges previously collected by defendant based upon

"Food

Service/Food

Establishment

Licensing

Fee

Standards"

were improperly assessed and should be returned to plaintiffs and
others paying the same.
5.
charges

Defendant
pursuant

should be restrained! from assessing
to

the

"Food

Ser\f ice/Food

further

Establishment

Licensing Fee Standards^^
Dated this

//

day

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
De«ii'iy C!e^*

Counsel for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

foregoing

certify

that

I hand

delivered

a

copy

of

the

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the office

of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, County Complex,
2100 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84105, this 3rd

day of August, 1987.
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S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
Telephone:
(801) 521-2552
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,

DISTRICT

STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION,
a Utah n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n ,
et a l • ,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
C i v i l No. C 8 6 - 9 0 2 4
(JUDGE MOFFAT)

v•

SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY
BOARD OF HEALTH,
Defendant.

The

above-entitled

matter

came

on

regularly

for

hearing

before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat,
Judge,

presiding;

and

plaintiffs

being

represented

by

their

counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq,, Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney;

and

the parties having

submitted

the matter

to the

Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and fssues for Determination;
and both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and
Authorities and

Reply Memoranda

in support of their respective

positions; and the matter having been argued
the

Court

having

reviewed

said

Memoranda,

to the Court; and
as

well

as

the

pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues and other

( H;!>'!;'

documents

filed of record: and the Court having heretofore made

and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of La~; ana the
Court being fully informed in the premises, now, therefore:
IT

IS

HERE3Y

ORDERED

Establishment Licensing

that

the

" Fooa

Service/Food

Fee Standards" adopted by defendant are

declared invalid, and null and void ab initio.
IT

IS

FuRTHER

ORDERED

that defendant be, ana heresy is,

restrained from attempting to impose any further charges pursuant
to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards".
IT
ordered

IS FURTHER

ORDERED

to refund and

from any of

that defendant be, and hereby

return

any payments previously

the plaintiffs pursuant

is,

received

to the "Food Service/Food

Establishment Licensir^ Fee Standards"

Dated

this

day of

fl<A^VT

1987

B

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Counsel for Derenaant

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEV
CLERK
O e p t i l y C-ifctrk

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

certify

that

I hand

delivered

a

copy

of

the

foregoing Judgment to the office of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy
County Attorney,
Lake City, Utah

County Complex, 2100 South State Street, Salt
84105, this 3rd day of August, 1987.

A'/sj,
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Utah Restaurant Association, a
Utah non-profit corporation; Utah
Retail Grocers Association, a Utah
non-profit corporation; Lamb's
Restaurant; Flying Dees Family
Restaurants; Kentucky Fried
Chicken-Harmon's Management Corp.;
Gastronomy, Inc.; Taco Maker, Inc.;
Market Street Grill; Market Street
Broiler; New Yorker Restaurant;
Hilton Hotels-Pearson Enterprises;
Sizzling Platter, Inc.; Stan's
Market; N.P.S.; Crystal Palace
Market; Wheel-In Market; The Table
Supply; Voyles Market; The Store;
Albertson's, Inc.; Family Market;
Safeway Stores, Inc.; Tanning
Experience; O.P. Skaggs #1; SAB
Enterprises; 8th Avenue Meat &
Grocery; Macey's, Inc.; Bell's 48th
St. Market; Peterson Foodtown;
Food-4-Less; Dan's Foods; Montie's
Bestway; and Hale's Market,

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case No. 870420-CA

FILED
MaryT Noonan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeats

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Salt Lake City-County Board of
Health,
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys:

David E. Yocom, Thomas L. Christensen, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Gary E. Atkin, Salt Lake City, for Respondents

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jacksdn.
JACKSON, Judge:
The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the -Board"),
seeks reversal of a declaratory judgment holding its food
service establishment inspection fee regulation, adopted under
the Local Health Department Act (the "Act"),1 legally
invalid. We reverse.
The Board is a non-elected body appointed by the Salt Lake
City and County Commissioners to act as a local board of
health. Its powers and duties are set forth in the Act. See
Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-14 (1984). At a June 1986 meeting, the
Board discussed reviving a plan to initiate an inspection fee to
be paid by "food service/food establishment" businesses. Staff
members presented information about inspection fee
classifications and schedules in several nearby states and
estimated the health department was spending $600,000 to inspect
food establishments at least twice yearly as required by Utah
State Food Service Regulations. The Board voted to hold a
public hearing on the inspection fee proposal. A fee schedule
(referred to as the "fee standard") was drafted, listing
categories of food establishments and setting annual inspection
fees that ranged from $40 to $100, depending on the number of
service bays, or the number of seats, or square footage. The
dollar amounts, categories, and definitions in the proposed
standard were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations of
the department's staff and the Board's deliberations.
After publication of notice in local newspapers and a
thirty-day period for public comment, during which copies of the
proposed fee schedule and regulation were made available to the
public, a public hearing was held on September 10, 1986, at
which approximately 30-40 people submitted oral and written
comments. There was no testimony or written evidence submitted
at this public hearing showing the basis for the food
establishment categories or fee amounts set forth in the
proposed inspection fee schedule. Health department staff
prepared a document summarizing and responding to the criticisms
of the proposed schedule made at the public hearing. The Board
also prepared a draft of its findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and order, required by Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984)
as part of the rulemaking process. See Utah Restaurant Ass'n v.
Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1985).
1.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 26-24-1 through -24 (1984).
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At its October 2, 1986, meeting, Board members again
discussed the fee schedule among themselves and heard
additional input from representatives of affected food
establishments. The Board then voted to institute the fee
program and adopted the prepared findings, conclusions, and
order, in which it found there was no information put forth by
critics demonstrating that the proposed fee was either
unlawful, excessive, not tied directly to the cost of the
inspection program ($453,000), or not to be used solely to
support that program. It also specifically found that the
proposed fees were reasonable and that they would raise
$156,000, approximately one-third of the annual cost of the
inspection program. With regard to the use of the new fees,
the Board stated:
9. Money collected by the proposed fee
will be deposited in an account of the
Health fund set up specifically to receive
monies generated by the proposed standard.
10. Funding to support the Food
Inspection Program will be drawn from the
account mentioned above in Item #9.
The respondents subsequently filed this declaratory
judgment action2 to challenge the fee regulation's
constitutionality and validity. After the parties stipulated
to undisputed facts regarding the sequence of events and the
basis for the Board's findings and conclusions, three issues
were submitted for determination
on cross-motions for summary
judgment and ruled on.3
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-33-1 through -13 (1987). £&£ Utah
Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County Bd. of Health, 709 P.2d 1159,
1161 (Utah 1985) (rules of county board of health constitute
"municipal ordinance" whose construction or validity can be
challenged in a declaratory judgment action).
3. The respondents also contended the Board had not complied
with the statutory procedural requirements in imposing the
fees, presumably for unarticulated reasons other than the lack
of evidence at the hearing to support the findings and fee
schedule. However, the trial court did not rule on this as a
separate issue, and it has not been raised in this appeal.
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The trial court held the fee regulation invalid and void ab
initio on each of the asserted grounds: (1) the findings of
fact and conclusions of law adopted by the Board on October 2,
1986, are not supported by evidence presented at the public
hearing held September 10, 1986, contrary to the requirements of
the Act; (2) despite its label, the inspection "fee" is invalid
because it constitutes a tax, which the Board is not statutorily
authorized to levy; and (3) even if it is not a tax, the Act
does not authorize the Board to impose fees in the form of
charges on food establishments to defray the costs of the food
establishment inspection program.
The Board contends the trial court erred on all three
points. On appeal, we do not defer to the trial courtfs rulings
on these questions of law. Instead, we review them under a
correction of error standard. E.g., Creer v. Valley Bank &
Trust Co,, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Dec. 9, 1588); Western Kane
County Spec. Serv. Distr. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d
1376 (Utah 1987).
VALIDITY OF BOARD FINDINGS
Section 26-24-20(1) of the Act gives the Board authority to
enact rules, regulations, or standards "necessary for the
promotion of public health . . . and the prevention of outbreaks
and spread of communicable and infectious diseases. • . ."
However, the Board is required to provide public hearings prior
to any such enactment. See Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(2)
(1984). Subsection (3) states:
The hearings may be conducted by the board
at a regular or special meeting, or the
board may appoint hearing officers, who
shall have power and authority to conduct
hearings in the name of the board at a
designated time and place. A record or
summary of the proceedings of any hearing
shall be taken and filed with the board,
together with findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and the order of the
board or hearing officer. In any hearing,
a member of the board or the hearing
officer shall have power to administer
oaths, examine witnesses, and issue notice
of the hearings or subpoenas in the name
of the board requiring the testimony of
witnesses and the production of evidence
relevant to any matter in the hearing.

870420-CA
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Utah Code Ann. § 26-24-20(3) (1984). Respondents do not assert
a complete lack of any basis for the proposed fee schedule.
Instead, respondents contend this section of the Act requires
the findings of the Board to be supported by at least some
evidence introduced at the required public hearing "or the
mandate for a public hearing is worthless." The parties agree
that the Board's fee standards were prepared on the basis of
information provided by health department staff to the Board
before the public hearing and not on the basis of evidence
submitted SLL the public hearing. Therefore, respondents argue,
the findings and the fee schedule are invalid.
In effect, respondents contend that the public hearing
mandated by the Act during rulemaking is a trial-type hearing.
They claim they were not fully informed of the information
submitted to and considered by the Board; they complain they
did not have the opportunity to offer rebuttal evidence or
cross-examine everyone submitting information to the Board.
Those are the main elements of a trial. The trial court
accepted this argument and held that the statute limited the
rulemaking process to consideration of "evidence" presented at
the September 10, 1986, public hearing. We conclude this is an
erroneous interpretation of the statute's requirements.
An inspection fee adopted by a local board of health was
also at issue in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County
Board of Health, in which the fee standard was invalidated
because the board had failed to comply with the statutory
requirement that findings of fact and conclusions of law be
filed. In thus applying the clear letter of the law, the court
noted that such a requirement is normally associated only with
the adjudication of a claim# not with rule promulgation. Id.
709 P.2d at 1164.
In interpreting this provision of the Act/ the Utah Supreme
Court clarified that subsections (1) through (3) of section
26-24-20 delineate the steps which a local board must follow in
its rulemaking process. Jfl. at 1161. In contrast/ subsections
(4) through (6) of the same section apply to enforcement
actions by a local health department. 2&. It is apparent
that, despite the use of terms normally employed in a trial
context, subsections (1) through (3) create a "notice and
comment" public hearing rulemaking process, not a trial-type
procedure.
There is no question that notice and opportunity to be
heard were provided to the public in accordance with the
statute. It is also apparent respondents had a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence to the Board supporting their
claims that the fee is unnecessary and burdensome and that the

870420-CA
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fee schedule is unreasonable in the way it categorizes food
establishments. The text of the proposed fee schedule, drafted
based on information provided to the Board by its staff, was
made available to the public during the comment period. The
public hearing was conducted by a health department staff
member as hearing officer, and three other representatives of
the department were present. Oral statements and written
comments were received from various organizations and
individuals, including many of the respondents and their legal
counsel. Attendees were informed that a summary of the hearing
and written comments would be submitted to the Board before its
regular meeting on October 2, 1986, and that interested parties
could attend that meeting and make additional comments. The
Board's staff prepared and submitted written responses to the
comments made at the September public hearing. Representatives
of the respondents and their legal counsel appeared at the
October 2 meeting and made further arguments to the Board prior
to its final adoption of findings, conclusions of law, and an
order approving the fee regulation.
The foregoing process comports with the procedure
prescribed in the statute. Further, the Board's procedures
were in accord with the purpose of a public rulemaking hearing,
i.e., to afford interested persons an opportunity to submit
written data, views, and arguments regarding why the proposed
regulation should or should not be adopted. £££ Colorado Auto
& Truck Wreckers Ass'n v. Department of Revenue. 618 P.2d 646,
652 (Colo. 1980) (in which the statute described the purpose of
the mandatory public hearing in these terftts).
Hearings in administrative rulemaking
procedure are usually either investigatory
or designed to permit persons who may not
have been reached in a previous process of
consultation and conference to come
forward with evidence or opinion. The
purpose is not to try a case, but to
enlighten the administrative agency, and
to protect private interests against
uninformed and unwise action.
2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 283 (1$62).
Section 26-24-20(3) cannot properly fye said to require an
adversarial, trial-type hearing when ther^ is no requirement that
the Board's rulemaking be based solely on a trial-type

870420-CA
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record.4 The statute does not say evidence must be produced at
the hearing and upon such evidence the Board shall make written
findings. Although the statute authorizes the Board or its
hearing officer to take testimony and compel witnesses to attend
or produce relevant "evidence" at the public hearing, it does not
say the Board shall act only on the basis of such "evidence" or
the record compiled exclusively at the public hearing. In
addition contrary to the trial court's reading of the statute,
it imposes no affirmative duty on the Board to submit evidence at
the public hearing in support of its own proposed fee
regulation. See Long v. Department of Nat. Res., 118 Ohio App.
369, 195 N.E.2d 128 (1963).
In short, although the Board must consider all material
presented to it during the public comment period and at the
public hearing that is relevant to a proposed rule or regulation,
the Act does not restrict it to acting only on such data or
testimony when finally adopting rules or regulations. See State
v. Hebert, 743 P.2d 392# 397 (Alaska App. 1987); International
Council of Shopping Centers v. Oregon Envtl. Quality Comm'n, 27
Or. App. 321# 556 P.2d 138 (1976). It may rely on its own
experience, its expertise, and any facts known to it from
whatever source they are drawn. See 1 K. Davis, Administrative
Law Treatise § 6.17 (2d ed. 1978); see also International Council
of Shopping Centers, 566 P.2d at 141 (agency involved in informal
4.
Trial procedure is inappropriate on
nonfactual issues, on issues of law or
policy# and on issues of broad legislative
fact. Trial procedure is especially
inappropriate for untangling jumbles of
policy, law/ discretion/ and legislative
fact. The reason for not using trial
procedure is that such procedure is not
intrinsically designed for nonfactual
issues; much administrative experience
proves that trial procedure to resolve
issues other than issues of adjudicative
fact or specific legislative fact is
wasteful, cumbersome, expensive, and
unhelpful. No trial judge would use trial
procedure to resolve a nonfactual issue.
Neither should an agency.
3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.3 (2d ed. 1980).
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rulemaking can properly rely on data gathered from publications
in its field, interviews/ input from advisory committees/ or even
information informally obtained). It follows that adverse public
input/ once considered by the Board/ may be disregarded even if
unrebutted by testimony or evidence presented at the public
hearing. See Colorado Auto & Truck Wreckers Ass'n, 618 P.2d at
652.
The trial court erred in holding the Board's findings of
fact and conclusions of law invalid under the Act.
AUTHORIZATION TO IMPOSE FEES
A local board of health has no inherent power to charge fees
or levy taxes of any kind. Utah Restaurant Ass'n v. Davis County
Bd, of Health, 709 P.2d at 1163-64. "Any such authority must be
conferred on it by the county which created it# acting within its
lawful authority, or by the legislature." I&. at 1164. In this
case# the Board contends it is authorized to impose an inspection
fee under its statutory grant of powers. In ruling that the
inspection fee constituted either an impermissible tax or an
unauthorized fee, the trial court focused only on section
26-24-14(14) of the Act, which gives a lqcal health department
authority to
establish and collect appropriate fees, to
accept, use and administer all federal,
state, or private donations or grants of
funds/ property, services, or materials
for public health purposes, and to make
such, agreements, not inconsistent with
law/ as may be required as a condition to
receiving such donation or grant[.]
The trial court concluded this provision does not authorize
the Board to offset a portion of the costs involved in
particular programs through the imposition of fees for that
program. According to the trial court, the term "fees" in this
section refers only to charges for "suchfrinoritems as
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees for
specific services to particular persons for their specific
benefit . . . ." We do not agree.
The term -fees" is used three times in the Local Health
Department Act. In addition to section 26-24-14(14), section
26-24-15(1) provides for apportionment of I the local health
department costs among participating counties and
municipalities and states that "money available from fees,
contracts, surpluses, grants, and donations may be used to
establish and maintain local health departments." Moneys
received from these sources, including "fees . . . for local
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health purposes, "are credited to a health department fund
which must be expended only for maintenance and operation of
the local health department. Utah Code Ann* § 26-24-18 (1984).
In all three sections of the Act, fees are grouped with
several other means of providing funds for establishing,
maintaining, and operating a local health department, including
its various programs designed to promote and protect public
health. There is not the slightest hint that the legislature
intended to restrictively define "fees" as involving only
minimal charges for clerical or ministerial services.5 We
therefore conclude that a charge imposed by a local board on
health department program participants to defray the costs of
the program is a "fee" within the purview of the Act.
FEE OR TAX?
Whether or not the particular food establishment inspection
fee regulation adopted by the Board is a "tax," not authorized
by the Act, turns on the actual purpose for its adoption. See
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164.
If the money collected is for a license to
engage in a business and the proceeds
therefrom are purposed mainly to service,
regulate and police such business or
activity, it is regarded as a license
fee. On the other hand, if the factors
just stated are minimal, and the money
collected is mainly for raising revenue
for general municipal purposes, it is
properly regarded as the imposition of a
tax, and this is so regardless of the
terms used to describe it.

wgfrer Pasig Hgrpe PvUders Ass'n v t Roy City* 26 Utah 2d 215, 487
P.2d 866, 867 (1971) (footnote omitted). See Provo Citv v, Provo
Meat & Packing Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477, 479 (1917)
(municipality may charge meat sellers fees to cover costs of
inspection and policing of meat sales).
5. The record before the Board shows that other fees are
regularly charged by the health department to offset the costs
of mandatory immunizations, as well as for inspections under
the asbestos and solid waste programs.
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In Utah Restaurant Association, which involved a similar
inspection fee regulation adopted by a local board of health,
the food establishments also claimed the fee was invalid as a
tax. The Utah Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue,
however, because the regulation was invalidated on the
alternative basis, noted above, i.e., tl^e board's failure to
file the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Utah Restaurant Ass'n, 709 P.2d at 1164. Nonetheless, the
court proceeded to issue an advisory opinion describing factual
findings by the board that would provide information supporting
a conclusion that its charge for inspecting food establishments
was a valid fee instead of a tax. See id. First, has the
regulation been designed to actually defray some or all of the
costs of inspecting the food service establishments on which it
is imposed? Second, is there some assurance that the money
collected will actually be used to defray those costs? With
adequate answers to these questions, a reviewing court can more
easily determine the true nature of the enactment, see id.., and
make the distinction drawn in Weber Basin Home Builders

Association, supraHere, the record demonstrates the Board acted to comply
with the advice in Utah Restaurant Association when it adopted
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Board
specifically found the actual cost of the food establishment
inspection program to be $453,000, of which only $156,000 would
be paid for by the proposed fees. The balance was to be raised
through food handler permits and general taxes. The Board's
findings, conclusions, and order require the collected
inspection fees to be deposited in a special account, to be
drawn upon to support the food establishment inspection
program. Furthermore, the record before the Board clearly
shows that the inspection fees were earmarked for the
inspection program and could be spent for no other purpose, a
fact reiterated before the district court in the unrefuted
affidavit of a deputy county auditor. Respondents did not
submit any controverting evidence or information on these
matters to the Board or to the trial court.
In light of the purpose of the inspection fee program, its
partial funding by fees imposed on the inspected food
establishments, and the restricted use of the collected fees,
we conclude the inspection fee regulation adopted by the Board
was not invalid as an unauthorized tax. The trial court's
ruling to the contrary was in error.
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The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Norman H. Jacks^fi, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

^ %Ut^J^
Russell w. Bench, Judge
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